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q 201For a brief post-Cold War moment, it seemed as if global division would yield to connectivity as marginal regions
would be rewired into the world economy. Instead, the post–9/11 years have seen the spread of ever-larger “no-go
zones,” seen as constituting a danger especially to Western states and citizens. Contact points are reduced as aid
workers withdraw, military operations are conducted from above, and few visitors, reporters, or researchers dare
venture beyond the new red lines. Casting an eye on this development while building on anthropology’s critical security
agenda, this article draws an ethnographic map of “global danger” by showing how perceived transnational threats—
terrorism, drugs, and displacement—are conjured, bundled, and relegated to world margins, from the sub-Saharan
Sahel to the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands. Drawing on ﬁeldwork conducted in Mali, it shows how a relationship
by remote control has developed as Western interveners seek to overcome a fundamental dilemma: their deep concern
with threats emanating from the danger zone set against their aversion toward entering it. As ambivalent sites of
distance and engagement, I argue, such zones are becoming invested with old fantasies of remoteness and otherness,
simultaneously kept at arm’s length and unevenly incorporated into a world economy of risk.Planning for ﬁeldwork in conﬂict-hit Mali in 2014 from my
then-London home, I clicked through Google Maps to search
for Timbuktu. In a split second, I got car directions for that
one-time epitome of remoteness—3 days and 12 hours via the
N-6 on a route that “has tolls,” “includes a ferry,” and “crosses
through multiple countries,” as the map helpfully informed
me. Yet that bright blue route curling down through Europe
and Africa was but a thin, even illusory thread of connectivity.
Timbuktu and northern Mali—an area that, only a few years
ago, hosted festival-goers and researchers eager to tap into
Mali’s rich culture—was by this time off-limits to most West-
ern visitors; it had become yet another reblanked part of the
world map at a time of rampant globalization.
Hic sunt dracones. Those medieval maps may not have
spelled out “here be dragons,” as we tend to think, yet they were
often adorned with fantastical creatures, dragons, and exotic
beasts that served as ﬂourishes or as indicators of the limits of
our knowledge (Van Duzer 2013). Now the beasts are back, or
so we hear on the news: vague threats are lurking in far-ﬂung
corners of our maps, areas where the inhabitants of the
Western world no longer dare venture. Syria and Iraq’s em-
battled border zones, Somalia and Pakistan’s tribal areas,
Afghanistan’s hinterland, and the northern reaches of the
sub-Saharan Sahel are all regions harboring a litany of con-n Andersson is an Associate Professor at the Department of In-
tional Development at the University of Oxford (Queen Elizabeth
e, 3 Mansﬁeld Road, Oxford OX1 3TB, United Kingdom [ruben
rsson@qeh.ox.ac.uk]). This paper was submitted 21 VII 15,
ted 4 XI 15, and electronically published 14 XI 16.
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saster, conﬂict and displacement: these dangers fester on the
margins of our maps, vague yet distant to Western publics,
forever at a remove until they blip by on the newscasts,
temporarily bringing news of distant atrocities and random
tragedies.
For most Western citizens, these new no-go zones are not
of great concern; they are remote and rarely any of their
business. Not so, however, for anthropologists, as our disci-
pline has long been intimately tied to the exploration of global
margins. In this article, starting with my own anthropological
dilemma at the edge of the danger zone of northern Mali, I
will give an account—at times personal, at times political—of
shifts in global insecurity and what role our discipline may
have in mapping and interrogating these shifts as we critically
draw on our disciplinary heritage.
The “danger question” has become increasingly acute for
anthropology as the discipline has had to face up to insecu-
rity on both practical and theoretical fronts in recent years.1
In Fieldwork under Fire, Nordstrom and Robben (1995) en-
gaged with dilemmas that have lingered on our ethnographic
ﬁeld of vision ever since: how to research and write about vio-
lence tearing through communities with which we are deeply
familiar, while adapting our methods and ethics to deal with
situations of conﬂict and danger. Their volume moreover high-1. A note on terminology: “risk” here refers to the projected impact
and likelihood of a threat, “danger” or “insecurity” designates the state
above an acceptable risk threshold, and “fear” is often the psychological
and emotional corollary of such danger.
served. 0011-3204/2016/5706-0001$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/689211
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ping onto “dangerous ﬁelds” (Kovats-Bernat 2002) since the
1990s (e.g., Besteman 1999; Daniel 1996; Sluka 2000). The
increasingly serious engagement with violence, (in)security,
and risk is also evident in landmark ethnographies set within
the West, whether in violent urban areas (Bourgois 2003;
Feldman 1991) or inside the powerful security apparatus itself
(e.g., Lutz 2001). In the post-9/11 era, with its various iterations
of the “war on terror,” this interest has ﬂourished (Fassin 2013;
Gusterson 2004; Masco 2014; Whitehead and Finnström 2013).
As evident from Maguire, Frois, and Zurawski’s (2014) volume
The Anthropology of Security, building on Goldstein’s (2010)
call for a “critical security anthropology,” anthropologists have
started to take (in)security seriously as an object of study in its
own right. As a result, they may no longer all leave a war zone
as journalists enter, as Malkki (1997:93) once put it—indeed,
some have even gone as far as advising militaries in the ﬁeld,
reinvigorating a much older cooptation of our working meth-
ods by those in power (Price 2011).
As the last sentence suggests, the problems with this move
onto “dangerous ﬁelds” of (in)security are manifold: ethical,
methodological, and political. Politically, our academic en-
deavors are symptomatic of security’s broader “colonization” of
ever-larger parts of social life, as Goldstein (2010:488) and
Maguire, Frois, and Zurawski (2014) have noted. Indeed, “secu-
rity” is now everywhere. In a compelling study of the post-9/11
US “counterterror state,” Masco (2014) notes how a catastrophic
ofﬁcial orientation toward unlimited future (terrorist) threats
has seen security practices extended into the global arena and
novel ﬁelds, ranging from disease control to development aid
and academia, where solid funding streams have emerged on
“border security,” “biosecurity,” “cybersecurity,” and “violent rad-
icalization.” At this post-Cold War juncture, characterized by
vicious cycles of ever-expanding security apparatuses and the
constant generation of novel threats (Masco 2014), one key task
for anthropology is to denaturalize security, calling into question
how it is summoned, how it is put to work, and how it is given
meaning in speciﬁc settings, as Goldstein (2010) has insisted.
Indeed, anthropologists are already providing the largerﬁelds
occupying the security terrain—international relations, sociol-
ogy, criminology, and “security studies” in all its shapes and
sizes—with a healthy dose of caution against putative “global”
claims on the nature of security as well as with methodological
inspiration as security scholars shift focus from discourse to
praxis (Bigo 2014). At this productive interface, Goldstein
(2010), Maguire, Frois, and Zurawski (2014), and Fassin (2013)
have all rightly urged anthropologists to be attentive to “lo-
cal expressions and meanings”2 as the content and form of
security shift across the world, from the terrorist focus of
the post-9/11 United States to the urban policing of Fassin’s2. Citation from the Cultural Anthropology online special on security,
http://www.culanth.org/curated_collections/14-security/discussions/13
-security-a-conversation-with-the-authors (accessed July 21, 2015).
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stein’s (2010) Bolivia. In this grounded manner, ethnographers
can help unpack the “black box” of security, an urgent task
indeed in our “dark times” (Fassin 2011) of deepening coun-
terterror measures, taller border barriers, and aggressive inner-
city policing.
Yet problems loom on practical fronts once we step out of
the West and enter the “red zones” of conﬂict, crime, and
instability of the kind I was preparing for in Mali in 2014,
which I will refer to in this article as the new global “danger
zones.”3 In a critical historical note, Kovats-Bernat (2002:211)
points out how the “stability in the ethnographic ﬁeld” once
guaranteed by colonial power no longer holds. Indeed, in an
era of rampant insecurity and fragile postcolonial states, our
quest for knowledge of the insecure Other is becoming inti-
mately tied up with the insecurity of the anthropological Self.
Starting with this personal and political predicament, I will
go down a complementary path to the localized route traced
by Goldstein, Fassin, and others in focusing on how global
forms of insecurity and danger are conjured, mapped, and
intervened upon by Western states, which remain the main
funders and instigators of international intervention. As Masco
recently put it, delineating such a ﬁeld of inquiry, “Across a
wide range of security concerns from climate change to infec-
tious disease new modes of surveillance are offering a real time
portrait of speciﬁc threats that transcend state borders. This
technological expansion in how danger is constituted, how it is
visualized, and how it is tracked in everyday life has the po-
tential to enable a new kind of planetary security discourse.”4
What follows, then, is an ethnographic mapping exercise
that traces the pathways and clusters of increasingly global
dangers. Although such an ethnographic effort will, to some
extent, have to be global, too (Burawoy 2000), in the material
that follows, the focus will be on the sub-Saharan Sahel, and
Mali in particular, as well as this region’s linkages in terms of
risk and danger with control centers and capitals elsewhere.
Even in its regionally circumscribed version, such an eth-
nography of global danger does present several anthropolog-
ical dangers: of context, of voice, and of method. As anthro-
pologists branch out methodologically to deal with conﬂict
“at a distance” (Robben 2010), our approaches may uneasily
come tomirror those of the interveners themselves—the drone-
wielding warriors, the headquartered aid worker managers,
and the bunkered embassy bureaucrats. However, I believe
this is one danger we should be willing to face, and not just
because anthropological insights will otherwise remain mar-
ginalized in larger academic and political debates, as Robben
(2010:20–21) shows was the case with Iraq. In fact, the su-tant danger zones cannot be elaborated on here for lack of space; compare
Lianos and Douglas 2000.
4. Masco in conversation, http://www.culanth.org/curated_collections
/14-security/discussions/13-security-a-conversation-with-the-authors
(accessed July 21, 2015).
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6. Public Radio International has crunched theUSﬁgures onno-go zones
and fatalities: http://www.pri.org/stories/2014–07–07/us-travel-warnings
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terventions itself presents an intriguing ethnographic chal-
lenge, as Feldman (2012:18–19) has asserted in a rather different
context. Our methodological limitations link us into this larger
ﬁeld of intervention; they constitute one more window onto a
distinctly global process of distance making and danger.
I will argue, then, that anthropologists may be very well
placed not only to embark on studies of the microphysics of
(in)security—its intricate local workings and manifestations—
but that we may also venture into researching the very globality
of insecurity and danger. I will suggest that one way of doing so,
complementing Masco’s (2014) archival approach, is to mine a
rather traditional ethnographic vein to its point of impossibil-
ity. In the exotic ﬁeldwork tradition, anthropologists are ca-
naries in the academic coal mine, poised at the very entrance to
the insecure world “out there.” An ethnography of global dan-
ger, then,may start with reﬂexively accounting for our own fears
and vulnerabilities at this threshold, as Kovats-Bernat (2002:
217) has also suggested. Here, our individual sense of danger,
rather than being a mere obstacle, may serve as a jumping-off
point as we survey the production of insecurity and novel
“security-scapes” (Gusterson 2004) in crisis-hit areas.
However, this reﬂexive turn is only the start. As will be clear
in the preamble below, concerned with my ﬁeldwork on Mali’s
conﬂict, anthropologists’ ambivalent relation to the dangerous
ﬁeld is but one small symptom of a much larger withdrawal by
international actors from the danger zone. Section one traces
this trend toward growing global distance, showing how a new
relationship by remote control has developed between (espe-
cially Western) interveners and intervened-upon populations.
Next, section two argues that this reorganization is itself in-
dicative of a larger sociopolitical shift as the relationship be-
tween the richest and poorest parts of the world is becoming
reframed through a set of clustered threats. The third section,
ﬁnally, looks at how danger and threat scenarios are also in-
creasingly mobilized as a local resource—that is, by institutions
and inhabitants of the danger zone—often with considerable
ambivalence and with counterproductive consequences.
How may we understand the growing geographical divides
between “red” and “green” zones today? In the conclusion, I
will build on the literature on global risk to suggest that the
increasing remoteness of red zones should not blind us to their
function within a world economy of risk and insecurity. An-
thropologists will have much to contribute to the under-
standing of this globalized role as we critically draw on our
disciplinary heritage of studying faraway places. Authors such
as Harms, Hussain, and Shneiderman (2014), McDougall and
Scheele (2012), Piot (1999), Saxer (2016), and Tsing (1993)
have in recent years radically reframed the old anthropolog-
ical trope of remoteness, showing supposedly remote areas
to be crisscrossed by intricate pathways linking them to
global and national orders. This article will show how dan-
ger may serve as precisely such a pathway; yet it is a path-
way of a particular sort. Danger is double-edged: it separates
yet draws us near. As interveners and politicians seek to drawThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aa distance between the West and the new danger zones,
the latter come to exercise a peculiar power over what Trouil-
lot (2003) has called the “Western geography of imagination.”
As risk and danger are being remapped and reimagined at
a time of supposed global connectivity, Western interveners,
citizens, and anthropologists increasingly fear entering yet
grow fascinated with the distant danger zone, with far-reaching
consequences that we are only just beginning to understand.
Preamble: Ethnography and the Withdrawal
from Danger
“The one thing that we can be certain about this year, in a
highly uncertain world, is that there is no longer any such thing
as far away.” These were the words of an executive with
Control Risk, a UK-based private security company, as he
launched his company’s Risk Map for 2015 with an online
video. Yet the map itself, set behind the executive, told a dif-
ferent story: on it, large swathes of the world were covered in
aggressive shades of red, indicating high or extreme risks,
rendering the world as a patchwork of safe, rich areas on the
one hand and impoverished, insecure no-go zones on the
other.5
While the Risk Map targets large corporations, including
those seeking to enter “frontier markets” in the red areas,
similar cartographic representations abound elsewhere, too.
During my research, I have come across the interactive maps
used by security companies to track risks to their clients; visual
depictions of blood-red danger zones in the media; sketched
cartographies of risk in Western foreign ministries; and the
familiar maps of ofﬁcial travel advice (ﬁg. 1). In this world of
red and green zones, the trend is clear: US no-go advice cov-
ered 12 African countries in 1996; by 2013, that ﬁgure was 18.
The UK Foreign Ofﬁce had 13 countries or parts of countries
on its global no-go list in 1997; in 2012, that ﬁgure was 40,
again with many new entries for Africa. Meanwhile, the
number of Western victims of terror attacks in regions such
as Africa in fact remains very low: only 15 of the 1,005
Americans killed in terrorist acts worldwide between 2004
and 2013 were killed in acts that took place on the continent,
for instance.6 Yet themedia impact of any attack, as seen from
Kenya to Tunisia, far surpasses the actual numbers, trigger-
ing swift changes in ofﬁcial travel advice and usually the exit
of Westerners. In this politicized landscape of risk assess-
ment, large areas of our maps are being painted in deep37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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at our own risk and peril (ﬁg. 2).
Mali, the case study in this article, has come to be em-
blematic of the global mapping of danger, not least as regards
the speed by which it descended into the “deep red” category
of extreme risk. For some time, this landlocked country was a
haven of peace and democracy in West Africa. Moreover, the
country’s “desert blues” festivals, its blue-clad Tuareg (Ta-
machek) nomads, and its deep historical heritage helped place
it on a cultural map of interest to tourists and anthropologists
alike (see Soares 2012 for a critical assessment). Yet all was not
right. By the late 2000s, travel advice was painting northern
Mali in a deep red owing to the growing jihadist presence. No-
travel advice meant no insurance, and so budget ﬂights from
Europe were cut, festivals cancelled, and contact points sev-
ered. By early 2012, a northern Tuareg rebellion—the fourth
since Mali’s independence from France in the 1960s—had
begun, followed by a coup d’état in Bamako. As northern Mali
was taken over by a combination of Tuareg separatists and
jihadist factions that spring, the simplistic donor notion ofThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aMali as an “aid darling” (Bergamaschi 2014) was swiftly being
transformed into something else entirely, as security analysts
started referring to the country as “Africa’s Afghanistan” (Sol-
omon 2013). As the jihadists eventually began pushing south,
the French responded by launching a military operation in
January 2013, retaking northern towns. Operation Serval was
eventually followed by an African peace force, integrated into
the United Nations (UN) Multidimensional Integrated Stabili-
zation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by mid-2013.
It was in this context that I had come to Mali in May 2014
for ﬁeldwork on international intervention, building on earlier
research in 2010–2011 on migration and border controls.
Descending onto Bamako’s Senou airport, one change from
the prewar years was already in evidence: on the tarmac stood
seven black UN military planes, lined up in waiting for the
cargo and personnel making their way to Mali’s war-scarred
north. Inside the airport terminal, a Western woman scuttled
between the police booths, overseeing Malian ofﬁcers grap-
pling with newly installed biometric equipment. Police aimed
infrared pistols at us, screening for Ebola. Mali, it was clearFigure 1. French media depiction of the global presence of ISIS/ISIL/Daesh. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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under international tutelage, its security assured by foreign
soldiers and its borders controlled by Western devices and
expertise. It was also a country marked by an edginess that I
had not experienced on previous visits, I thought, as I ﬁnally
found a taxi in a remote corner of the airport parking lot. As
we bumped our way down empty streets toward central Ba-This content downloaded from 158.143.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms amako, I kept looking over my shoulder, as if on guard against
an unlikely ambush.
Studying the international response to the Mali conﬂict, as
well as its interaction with longer-running interventions tar-
geting the chronic livelihoods crises of the Sahel, as I had set
out to do, was to prove a challenge. As I had prepared for
ﬁeldwork in early 2014, the question of whether I would ac-Figure 2. UK travel advice, 1997 (top) versus 2012 (bottom). Countries with no-travel advice are shown in dark gray; no-travel advice
for part(s) of country in light gray. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
7. Figures are from the Committee to Protect Journalists (https://www
.cpj.org/killed/; accessed July 21, 2015); theHumanitarianOutcomes database
(https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/summary; accessed July 21,
2015); and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations online database
(http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/fatalities.shtml; ac-
cessed July 21, 2015), respectively.
712 Current Anthropology Volume 57, Number 6, December 2016tually be able to visit the places of concern to my research had
become increasingly acute. Going north, as travel advice, the
newscasts, and my university kept telling me, meant exposure
to unseen dangers. Along with being home to an array of rebel
groups, the region presumably still harbored al Qaeda af-
ﬁliates who threatened kidnap and targeted attacks. The risk
was such that, as I interviewed Control Risk ofﬁcers in Lon-
don, they acknowledged they had had to turn down a project
in the region owing to “internal risk” to staff. If companies
capitalizing on global insecurity would not go themselves, then
who would? Was it not cowardly to stay away, though, and
did not locals face much larger dangers? There I sat, in my
London ofﬁce, scheming and tallying and anxiously eyeing the
news as “the ﬁeld” receded ever further from full ethnographic
reach.
Now that I had ﬁnally arrived, I would only stay in the
capital; yet even this highly circumscribed visit had not been
all that easy, despite Bamako being some 1,000 km away
from the northern “front line.”While the north was still a no-go
zone, colored red on UK travel advice maps, the capital had
“none but essential” advice because of the kidnap and ter-
ror threat. As a consequence, my university had asked me to
complete a drawn-out risk assessment, ﬁll in long forms, at-
tend security meetings, and read up on safe procedures. I had
to provide the university’s private security contractor with spe-
ciﬁc information to be used in case I were to be kidnapped, and
I was given a security app through which I had to log every day
as proof of life. My top-up kidnapping insurance mounted to
£1,000 for a month, which was discounted, after some hard
bargaining, to £750 as long as I did not leave the capital. With
such rates and procedures, none but the most dedicated would
even attempt to arrive in Mali, precisely at a time when the
country was thirsting for renewed connections.
My predicament was far from unique. Other academics,
journalists, humanitarians, and even soldiers and security con-
tractors, such as the Control Risk ofﬁcers, face the problem of
no-go zones, although we rarely dwell publicly on our decisions
about entering them. Yet the dilemma can no longer be ignored,
because whole chunks of the contemporary world, fromMali to
Pakistan and beyond, are rife with dangers—at least if we are to
trust our employers, newspapers, insurance companies, and
travel advice–wielding foreign ministries. As I spoke informally
to academic colleagues working on Mali and the wider Sahel, I
would sense the shift ﬁrsthand: researchers with long familiarity
with the region were now staying away and ﬁnding other topics
and destinations, in part owing to personal concerns and in part
because universities may refuse to give the green light to their
trips. The same also applied to me: as I e-mailed my university’s
security provider to tell them the mobile app served little pur-
pose in Bamako, I still followed their advice of not leaving the
capital.
Again, as is the case for other researchers, my apprehen-
sions cannot be blamed on institutional straightjackets alone.
Terrorist risk may be limited, statistically speaking, yet the
speciﬁc insecurities besetting crisis zones such as northernThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aMali still do remain real. Although the trend remains dis-
puted, it is clear that armed groups increasingly see those
who were once deemed neutral to conﬂict, such as reporters,
aid workers, and peacekeepers, as fair game. The killing of
journalists worldwide remains high, with 61 conﬁrmed deaths
in 2014; 155 aid workers were killed in 2013, according to one
count, the highest ﬁgure for many years; and fatalities among
peacekeepers are also rising, albeit still short of a spike in the
early 1990s (ﬁg. 3). InMali, as in Syria and Libya, jihadist groups
have come to see Western hostages as a propaganda tool and
source of income owing to large ransom payments, thus ra-
cializing risk in troubling ways.7
Grappling with high-risk areas, as researchers are now ex-
plicitly doing (e.g., Sriram 2009), we have a range of options at
our disposal, yet all of these options uneasily reﬂect the new
global fault lines between safety and danger. As anthropol-
ogists, we may opt for “armchair anthropology redux,” bol-
stered bynew communications technology (Gusterson 1997) and
our lingering ﬁeld authority—that is, the experience of “having
been there,” to paraphrase Hannerz (2003). Alternatively, we
may follow the freelance reporters skirting roadblocks and
boldly set out as “ethnographic explorers,” again reviving early
anthropological approaches of engaging with the “dangerous
Other.” More pragmatically, we may engage in “ethnography
by proxy,” drawing on local collaborators, or start “ﬁeld-
hopping,” skirting the danger zone by visiting for short pe-
riods and restricting ourselves to relatively safe areas. These
options, however combined, constitute pragmatic ways of
retaining a hold on important research topics (Kovats-BernatFigure 3. United Nations peacekeeping fatalities by year.37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
8. My Bamako and Dakar (regional headquarters) research has in-
volved about 60 interviews with UN staff, aid workers, peacekeepers, and
local associations.
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offs with insecurity, they also indicate some of the points of
friction, conﬂict, and ambivalence characteristic of a rela-
tionship between rich and poor that is increasingly framed by
potential danger.
As for my own research, rather than persisting with gaining
entry toMali’s northern danger zone, I decided to stay away. A
cop-out, perhaps. But it is the cop-out deployed by an ever-
larger number of groups, including Western militaries, which,
after all, are equipped to face the deadliest risks. My aim be-
came to understand the remote-controlled interventions in-
creasingly engaged in by the UN andWestern powers at a time
of supposed global connectivity. As a consequence, my ﬁeld
had to be reshaped around the means and sites used to draw
distance toward and intervene in the danger zone. Traveling
across an extended ﬁeld site stretching from Western govern-
mentministries toUNmission headquarters, online visuals, and
the aid world of Bamako, I started circling the danger zone,
seeing it from above, scanning and mapping it somewhat like
an anxious drone of the kind deployed by the US, UN, and
France to monitor (or kill) distant threats.
Seeing theMali conﬂict through this reﬂexive risk lens, I thus
came to treat my own ethnographic predicament as symp-
tomatic of a larger shift in the landscape of international in-
tervention. For instance, the mere detail of the security app on
my mobile, provided by a competitor to Control Risks, linked
me to an institutional and globalized framing of speciﬁc dan-
gers while also serving as a nagging reminder that I was some-
how detached even from the rather safe Bamako conﬁnes of my
study. Along with my insurance arrangements and ﬁeldwork
anxieties, the app illustratedhow security riskwas beingmapped
onto Mali in highly political ways, enabling some forms of
connectivity—and some forms of risk-taking—while disabling
others, just as was the case in other high-risk and conﬂict areas,
from the Syria-Iraq axis to Somalia, Libya, and the “AfPak”
(Afghanistan-Pakistan) borderlands. This geography of inter-
vention will be the focus of the next section.
Distance to Danger: A Relationship
by Remote Control
Since my last visit of 2010–2011, the international presence of
Bamako had shifted radically. The only traveling toubabs, or
white folk, who remained in the new Bamako were ragged
adventurers of a familiar kind, including rough-hewn luck-
seekers from France and the odd trans-Saharan bikers. From
the terrace of my guesthouse, I and the bikers observed a new
generation of punters stream past each night: young Western
humanitarian managers heading for the breezy rooftop bar;
African mine-clearers with the UN Mine Action Service;
freelance journalists, linen-clad and lanky; and African peace-
keepers in uniform. “Peaceland,” as Autesserre (2014) has
called the self-contained world of UN missions, had de-
scended on Bamako like an extraterrestrial ship unloading its
cargo and personnel, and the capital’s guesthouses had beenThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms arepurposed to hold their spillover, throwing a lifeline to our
Swiss host and her staff.
One night, I found one of Bamako’s newcomers under the
terrace fans. Monica was an administrator with the UN;
staying in our guesthouse, she was about to be sent up to
Mali’s north. Such trips to far-ﬂung danger zones had been
her life for the better part of two decades; arriving inMali, she
had bumped into old colleagues from Kosovo. Monica’s long
experience should have prepared her for the dangers of Mali,
yet there was something with this mission that unsettled her.
“I don’t feel calm here,” she conﬁded during one of the many
nights when we spoke on the terrace. “This is the ﬁrst time
that I have felt vulnerable, and it’s not as if it’s my ﬁrst
mission. . . . It was different in Congo; there the mission was
well established. Here they are not in control; they are not
prepared. I don’t feel safe.” To make matters worse, her grasp
of French, Mali’s old colonial language, was tenuous at best.
“CNMA, what are they called?” she asked with a laugh, re-
ferring to the main Tuareg separatist faction, the MNLA, or
the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (the
name used by the separatists in northern Mali). “I could in
theory have said no to this, but it’s what I signed up for, it’s a
peacekeeping mission.”
Monica’s apprehensions were shared bymany of the “expats”
I interviewed in Bamako, including at the UN mission, UN
agencies, Western embassies, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs).8 To some extent, these doubts reﬂected political
tensions aroundMINUSMA. In 2014, some troop-contributing
countries had argued that this type of mission (authorized to
use force and deployed in parallel to the French military oper-
ations) dangerously blurred the line with counterterrorism;
meanwhile, among humanitarian agencies, the mission’s inte-
grated character was seen as adding to the risks to staff, because
they were perceived as being under the same UN umbrella as
the soldiers. However, by spring 2014, not many successful at-
tacks against the internationals had taken place, or as one UN
ofﬁcer collating data on these toldme, “Mali’s not Afghanistan.”
That was sadly about to change. In late 2014, amid growing
attacks on peacekeepers, one high-ranking UN ofﬁcial would
despairingly tell me in New York: “There is no enemy any
longer, and who is the target?We are.” The “multi-dimensional
integrated stabilization mission in Mali” had a long name that
tried to hide the fact it was a peacekeeping mission with no
peace to keep, hostage to elusive dangers lurking on the ho-
rizon.
As it set up shop across Mali in mid-2013, MINUSMA had
geared its operations toward these yet-to-be-realized dangers.
In the northern towns of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal, peace-
keepers and civilian UN staff lurked behind high walls, from
where—or so locals complained—they all too rarely emerged
to keep the people safe from attacks by either rebels, stray37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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9. Figures from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations website,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/fatalities.shtml
(accessed July 21, 2015).
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1,000 km away from Timbuktu, Monica and her colleagues
labored at one remove from the locals. For its headquarters,
MINUSMAhad commandeered the ﬁve-star Hotel de l’Amitié
in central Bamako. To Mali’s government, the very decision
to locate the mission HQ in the capital was a provocation,
indicating the state’s failure to manage its own affairs. To the
UN, however, the reason behind a Bamako base was simple:
insecurity in the war-scarred north—that is, precisely the
insecurity it was supposedly there to prevent. Amitié was off
bounds to any locals behind its cement vehicle barriers, curls
of razor wire, and tanks manned by armed blue helmets. Its
pool, which on my last visit was a favored haunt of the local
elite, now hosted restaurants serving up crisp pizzas to
Danish soldiers and American political advisers. As UN staff
drove up to the gates at lunchtime in their identical white
four-wheel drives, they clogged up the busy road outside,
frustrating local drivers, not least since everyone knew that
theMalian government had to pay a large subsidy for housing
MINUSMA in the hotel.
This bunkering was in itself indicative of a trend toward
fortiﬁcation since the 1990s, whether by the UN or by the
United States in postinvasion Baghdad (Chandrasekaran 2006).
As noted by a growing body of studies (e.g., Dufﬁeld 2010; Fast
2014; Andersson andWeigand 2015), such bunkering and buff-
ering has increased the distance from local society in a danger-
ous spiral that risks generating novel dangers as contact points
diminish and resentment stirs, as was to be the case in Mali in
2014.
As I walked Bamako’s darkened alleyways at night, joining
streetside grins (friendship groups) for tea or meeting with
friends, it was soon becoming clear that the foreign inter-
veners, recently welcomed as liberators, were no longer all that
popular. The international party scene, the seemingly exces-
sive pay, and talk of rising prostitution stirred resentment, but
the main cause of anger was the impression that the UN was
not providing security in the north.
Critique was voiced internally, too. In the words of one
peacekeeper, MINUSMA was a “giant with a bloated head and
clay feet,” teetering precariously on the northern front lines as
the bunkered headquarters of Bamako grew ever larger. In-
deed, the north was mainly patrolled by African soldiers who
performed this task without armored cars, with scant protec-
tion, and with little preparation for the dangers ahead. Un-
surprisingly, they would also end up being the largest takers
of casualties as attacks kept mounting. By February 2015,
there were already 46 dead in the mission, and the number
kept rising thereafter. Unlike 1990s missions, such as the UN
Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), which saw a fairly equal
division of fatalities among Asian (44%), African (22%), and
Western (34%) peacekeepers, the mission in Mali has expe-
rienced a disproportionate number of African fatalities. Among
the 46 fatalities in Mali, 5 were Asian and 41 were African, with
18 of these from a single country, Chad, whose soldiers manned
both the French counterterror front line and the riskiest regionsThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
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held up as a goal in powerful quarters (Tardy and Wyss 2014),
has here entailed a risk transfer away from well-prepared West-
ern soldiers toward the ragtag brigades of the Africans, as Eu-
ropean ofﬁcers readily recognized in interviews.
A similar trend was besetting nonmilitary operations, with
Malian and regional African workers manning the operations
of UN agencies and NGOs up north. The reason usually
given for this division of labor between frontline Africans and
headquartered Westerners was the terrorist and kidnapping
risk—the same risk that had already triggered withdrawals of
staff in the preconﬂict years, when Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) started extending its reach. By 2015, this
security-based division had been replicated in other parts of
the region, or as one NGO emergency coordinator told me,
speaking of Boko Haram–threatened areas in northern Nige-
ria: “If your complexion is anything less than a Nigerian’s, you
won’t really be going.” Not only was the map of intervention
here being divided into safe and unsafe zones, it was also being
racialized in inverse relation to the jihadist strategy of target-
ing white-skinned Westerners.
Aid workers, like UN ofﬁcials, lived under intricate rules
regarding what transport to use and which areas were safe to
visit even in Bamako. One embassy that I visited was relo-
cating away from a route close to the presidential palace be-
cause of fears of becoming a target of irate demonstrators; yet
as one resigned embassy employee told me, “You can’t be
100% prepared all the time. You must get on with work and
life as well.” One NGO had plastered maps of no-go areas on
its wall, including neighborhoods within Bamako as well as
all areas outside the city limits. Meanwhile, European Union
(EU) military trainers, whose hotel-based ofﬁces were set
behind tall fences, were not allowed to venture into the north.
Instead, they trained their Malian counterparts and waved
them off toward the northern front lines, where brutal clashes
were to occur during that May of 2014, as the following ﬁeld
account illustrates.Lockdown on the Niger
The trouble started with a visit by the Malian prime min-
ister to Kidal. The northern town had been left as the MNLA
rebels’ bastion after the French intervention, much to Bamako’s
chagrin. The French were playing a double game in the north,
keeping the MNLA as allies while routing jihadists in the
hinterland, and the premier now wanted to give this ar-
rangement a push as he arrived in Kidal on May 17 with the
intention of showing support for patriotic locals and state
administrators.
He failed. As the prime minister tried to make it into central
parts of Kidal, armed men took ofﬁcials at the town’s gover-37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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and UN soldiers stood by, the hostages were executed.
Soon, protests began. On our grainy guesthouse television, I
saw protesters screaming into the night in downtown Bamako:
rumors had it a UN vehicle had been torched. The next day,
aid workers were scrambling to exit the north, but no ﬂights
were leaving. Anger against perceived UN and French inaction
in Kidal was mounting, as was anger against northern Tuaregs
and Arabs, seen as partial to the separatist cause. Mali was yet
again a tinderbox about to ignite; yet the Kidal events were but
the start to the cruellest week Mali had seen for some time.
“Have you heard the news?” I was in a plush hotel in northern
Bamako on the night of May 21 when a European researcher
broke the latest developments to me. Malian forces, some of
them recently trained and equipped by the EU, had attacked the
rebels in Kidal without informing the French or MINUSMA;
then the MNLA had routed them. Kidal had fallen, followed by
Menaka further south. “The Malian soldiers just ran away,” the
researcher said; they hid in the UN camp while the rebels stole
their EU-provided vehicles. We walked upstairs to the hotel
restaurant, set on a terrace brimming with soldiers and UN
workers, to dine with a friend of ours from an NGO. What
would the implications be down here in Bamako?
Over dinner, our friend looked out over the gatheredmen in
uniforms. “I shouldn’t really be here,” she said, but let it be.
Bamako’s expat humanitarians tried to keep separate from the
military, yet socially speaking, this was proving impossible;
they mingled on the same circuit, stuck in the same high-end
haunts. Our researcher colleague was nervous, too; she was not
allowed to go anywhere by foot, according to new security
instructions from somewhere. (Her embassy? Intelligence?
She would not say.) Instead, she borrowed our friend’s des-
ignated driver and left, as the NGO worker conﬁded that she,
too, was not really allowed to move around this area after
dark.
After a nervous journey back that night, I awoke the next
day to a Bamako in lockdown mode. Angry crowds gathered
outside MINUSMA’s headquarters and the French embassy’s
antiblast barriers. My meetings were cancelled. International
organizations told their staff to stay indoors and away from the
center. An interviewee from the EU training mission could not
meet with me, he explained, because they were in “alternative
planning” for the foreseeable future: military ofﬁcers could not
leave their barricaded hotel without security escort, and their
barracks outside the capital were under curfew. Up north,
further protests were brewing, and aid workers started evac-
uating the city; the situation was swiftly getting out of hand.
The protests and the rekindled northern troubles, which
were eventually quelled as the Malian government softened its
tone, revealed the fragile hold of international interveners on
the north. Having failed to capitalize on initial local trust, the
UN and France had instead built more distance from local
society, paving the way for a spiral of negative rumors and
resentment. Meanwhile, the Malian state was withdrawing its
scattered presence up north, including its forces. The effortsThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
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and the divide between south and north—and between op-
erational headquarters and northern hinterland—was grow-
ing deeper than ever.The Interventionist’s Dilemma
This brief account of Mali’s troubles and the internationals’
role in it may recall what Lianos and Douglas (2000:110–111),
in a prescient piece, called “dangerization,” or the growing
Western “tendency to perceive and analyse the world through
categories of menace.” Their focus is criminological: as an
example, they give a middle-class driver speeding past a hous-
ing estate because of the potential danger therein, and they ask
whether a new “norm of distance rather than proximity” is
being forged in Western societies. The speeding driver is,
however, an apt metaphor, too, for the widerWestern and UN
engagement with global danger, as seen in the bunkers and
four-wheel drives of Mali, as well as in the anxieties on show
once such physical protections fail. Dangerization and distance-
making went hand in hand in Mali: risk aversion opened a gap
between interveners and “intervened-upon” as well as between
foreign and local workers. The result was not the quelling of
danger but rather its proliferation, as seen outside the bun-
kered conﬁnes of the UN and the French embassy that May and
in later protests during 2014–2016.
This trend toward distance is evident well beyond Mali, as
already noted. In the UN sphere, Western withdrawal from
dangerous peacekeeping missions may be said to have started
in the 1990s, after the deadly UNOSOM mission to Somalia
and the highly planned killings of Belgian troops in Rwanda on
the eve of the genocide, yet it has accelerated in recent years. In
non-UN military interventions, a similar pattern has evolved:
instead of the mass deployments of yesteryear’s Afghanistan,
Western governments are now supporting proxies and drop-
ping bombs, as in Syria or in Libya; deploying drones, as in
Pakistan or Somalia; and training local soldiers to do the hard
graft, as in Somalia or the Sahel-wide “Flintlock” exercise of the
US military’s Africa Command. Security is also being out-
sourced to a private military industry of multibillion-dollar
revenues—a trend matched by the surging market for remote-
controlled weapons and surveillance systems. As for aid in-
terventions, powerful Western funders have, in recent years,
leaned heavily on NGOs and the UN to enter, stay, and “de-
liver” in distant danger zones, rather than exit them. Yet, as
noted, these operations too are increasingly managed at arm’s
length, through local partners and staff. After Iraq, Western
powers no longer want to put “boots on the ground,” except for
their most violent special operations, and they are not willing
to risk “their” aid workers or journalists coming into harm’s
way. Western powers and international agencies increasingly
face an “interventionist’s dilemma” of ambivalent engagement
and anxious withdrawal: stuck on themargins of danger zones,
seeing them through the eyes of local helpers or the latest
surveillance machinery.37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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some levels a pragmatic response to both growing risks and
cost-cutting demands, yet it is more than this, too. It involves
the exercise of a detached kind of power, one aspect of which
is the active transfer of risk down the social scale, toward
regional peacekeepers or national aid workers, strengthening
a trend in evidence from earlier post–Cold War conﬂicts and
crises (Shaw 2005). Almost nine out of 10 aid worker fatalities
now occur among national staff; meanwhile, in Somalia alone,
some estimates list about 3,000 dead African Union peace-
keepers in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
operation, funded by the United States, the EU, and the UN to
the tune of billions of dollars.10 A relationship by remote
control also leads to growing “blank spaces” on our maps,
from where little reliable information emanates. These blank
spaces, as the next section will show, can easily be “colonized”
by a complex constellation of dangers in an expansionary trend
with troubling consequences for local society.
Mapping Danger: Bundling and Placing the Threats
Back in December 2010, I stood looking out over a smog-hazed
Niger river from the ofﬁces of the EU delegation in Bamako,
where I had come to interview a diplomat about irregular
migration. By this time, things had not yet gonewholly downhill
for Mali: Bamako roared with thousands of imported Chinese
motorbikes, and its skyline was graced by Libyan-owned hotels.
On street level, posters of Colonel Gaddaﬁ next to the Malian
president, Amadou Toumani Touré, showed who was bank-
rolling Mali’s political class. What was missing, however, was
the Western presence of earlier years, as travel advice had cut
tourist numbers. On the surface, the reason for the changed
advice seemed quite simple: worsening insecurity as jihadists
had started kidnapping Westerners in Mali’s north. However,
there was a catch, as I heard during my interview at the EU
ofﬁces.
The travel warnings were “pure politics,” according to the
diplomat. Rather than being based on actual threats, they were
meant to force Mali to cooperate in crackdowns on terrorism,
drugs, and irregular migration in the vast desert north—
Europe’s top three priorities, with migration, in particular,
being a key concern. “You hit people where it hurts, and
that’s tourism,” the diplomat said, adding, “You could go and
tap dance naked in Kidal, and nothing would happen.”
Three years later, in November 2013, two French jour-
nalists were kidnapped and killed outside Kidal. By then, the
political posters of downtown Bamako and the world they
represented were gone: Gaddaﬁ was dead following the NATO
air campaign, and Touré was in exile after the spring 2013
coup, the country haltingly recovering from war. The north
had become what European governments had preemptively an-
nounced in 2010: a no-go area of nebulous risks and dangers.10. Ratio on humanitarians from Humanitarian Outcomes. The ﬁg-
ures for the African Union are disputed; the African Union has given a
much lower ﬁgure, at approximately 500.
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doubt, just don’t go. If you do go, you have only yourself to
blame, as the UK and US governments have repeatedly shown,
as they refuse to budge when kidnappers threaten to murder
their hostages. Yet, in fact, the mapping of insecurity and
danger—that is, naming and placing the threat—is itself a
highly complex and controversial political act.
During those days in 2010 in Bamako, Malian tourist of-
ﬁcials were fuming as a lifeline for the country’s economy was
being pulled away. Visiting the town of Djenne that winter,
whose mudmosque was once a must-see on theMalian tourist
trail, I would myself notice an anger that I had not felt on
previous visits: children pulling faces and blank stares from
adults, where before Mali’s famous hospitality would have
promised warm greetings and long discussions over pungent
green tea. The withdrawal of tourism had not forced Malian
cooperation, as the Europeans hadwished; instead, it was simply
ruining local livelihoods and stirring resentment against the
meddling foreigners.
African politicians have often raised red ﬂags over blanket
travel advice, arguing that curtailing tourism may in fact fuel
terrorism as local employment chances recede.11 There is no
space to delve into this debate here; rather, by citing the EU
diplomat, I simply wish to highlight how Western states have
sometimes deployed the seemingly apolitical tool of travel
advice in a bid to force cooperation on key political objectives.
Moreover, his assertions reveal the “danger” of the danger
zone to be a slippery signiﬁer indeed. Instead of being simply
about security risks toward (Western) citizens from terrorism,
the diplomatic strategy for Mali bundled such risk with quite
distinct “risks” (drugs, migration), all the while placing this
bundle in a discrete geographical space. There is, in addition, a
peculiar temporal time frame to this, as future probabilities of
danger are projected into a rather generic spatial distance, as
the following citation from a UK House of Commons report
on North Africa and the Sahel also illustrates (my italics):
[In]Mali, an al Qaeda-ruled rump state was a reality for some
months, and some of our witnesses considered that Mali’s
neighbors were potentially vulnerable to a similar fate. Niger
and Mauritania were singled out, and Mali itself was not yet
seen as being out of the danger zone. It is reasonable to as-
sume that an Islamist statelet somewhere in north-west Africa
would be a centre of smuggling, people trafﬁcking and kid-
napping; activities that already go on in the region. . . . A
rump state would have the potential to disrupt or destabi-
lize its neighbors and—although this point is speculative—
launch attacks on more distant enemies. (FAC 2014:38)
A center for smuggling and people trafﬁcking; the French
defense minister echoed these concerns in May 2014 as his
Mali-based forces were regrouping into the regional counter-11. See, for example, theNew York Times on coastal Kenya (Gettleman
2015) or the Guardian on Tunisia (Grierson and Mason 2015).
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remain inMali, and 3,000 in the Sahel-Sahara zone, the danger
zone, the zone of all types of smuggling,” he told reporters.
“Wewill stay as long as necessary. There is no ﬁxed date” (BBC
2014). As he indicated, cross-border ﬂows—drug trafﬁcking
and especially irregular migration—are here, besides terror-
ism, coming to function as key drivers of intervention; more-
over, they are part and parcel of the constitution of certain
areas as danger zones, taken (in both the UK and French
examples) as no-man’s lands rife with criminal activity.
Northern Mali—like much of the rest of the Sahel-Sahara
belt—has, in this sense, come to play host to a potent “threat
cluster” in the eyes of Western interveners. There is certainly
a long colonial and postcolonial history to this construction.
The Sahara, McDougall and Scheele (2012) have shown, has
long been seen as a space of dangerous remoteness in the
Western imagination, portrayed as “a deserted place, were
the permanent struggle of humanity against nature has de-
prived people of one of their most human characteristics,
namely, the ability to change and to creatively inﬂuence the
course of events” (2012:9). Against this putatively empty,
romanticized, and dangerous space conjured by the colo-
nizing West, McDougall and Scheele assert the intricate con-
nections linking different parts of the region. Focusing on these
connections makes the Sahara come alive socially, or as they
emphasize: “The onlywaywe can ﬁll the emptiness of the Sahara
while avoiding long-standing stereotypes and misleading cate-
gorizations is by conducting research locally” (2012:16). Much
the same can be said for other forms of engagement, from aid
work to diplomacy and peacekeeping.
Yet here is the rub. Instead of gaining a local perspective,
peacekeepers, aid workers, journalists, researchers, and UN
ofﬁcials have increasingly come to draw distance to the dan-
ger zone as the default option, thus reinforcing the region’s
remote and risky character. The desert danger zone of ofﬁ-
cial imaginations here appears as a peculiar kind of “non-
place” (Augé 1995) ripe for certain kinds of intervention—
that is, interventions focused on the overlapping threats to
the West.
Besides the historical context of the Sahara, a more recent
global frame is just as important in understanding the map-
ping of danger onto northernMali. In the post–ColdWar era,
policymakers grappled with how to deﬁne the West’s new
geopolitical “others,” and the most abject of these came to be
known as the “failed state.” Since the 1990s, the failed state
has kept rearing its head in “gray” policy and academic lit-
erature, despite a substantial critique of its application as
“mainly reﬂectingWestern powers’ policy concerns” (Nay 2013:
328) and of its diagnosis as ﬂawed. When, in the midst of the
French deployment to northern Mali in early 2013, the UK
primeminister referred to the area as an “ungoverned space,” he
resurrected the failed-state paradigm in new garb, ignoring how
too much state meddling, especially in northern Mali’s drug
trade, was at the core of the problem (Guichaoua 2013).
It is worth backtracking a little to see these superﬁcial models
of “political otherness” in their earliest, crudest forms. In an (in)This content downloaded from 158.143.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms afamous piece, “The Coming Anarchy,” Robert Kaplan (1994)
set the tone for post–Cold War anxieties over the poor non-
Western world. His words sound rather prescient two decades
hence, even though the anxieties he spells out have since
modulated away from urban crime toward jihadism:
West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demo-
graphic, environmental, and societal stress, in which crim-
inal anarchy emerges as the real “strategic” danger. Disease,
overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources,
refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states
and international borders, and the empowerment of private
armies, security ﬁrms, and international drug cartels are
now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African
prism. . . . To remap the political earth the way it will be a
few decades hence—as I intend to do in this article—I ﬁnd I
must begin with West Africa. (Kaplan 1994)
Another important step in this radical “remapping of the
political earth” was taken a decade later by an inﬂuential
American geostrategist. Setting out a road map for US military
interventions, Thomas Barnett (2004) divided the world into
its developed “functioning core” and the “non-integrated (or
non-integrating) gap.” The latter referred to regions beset by
instability that may breed future terrorists (Masco 2014:187),
and Barnett emphasized the need to focus military inter-
ventions in this gap. As areas “where people still go medieval
on one another” (Barnett cited in Keen 2012:188), here any
means were allowed, he argued, including preemptive war.
Barnett’s (2004) theories have given intellectual gloss to new
counterterror tactics, mapping “the everywhere war” against
terrorism (Gregory 2011) onto discrete and distant sites. Be-
sides Barnett’s gap, another example of such mapping is what
analysts and diplomats refer to as the global “arc of instability,”
which in one of its various versions extends from the Sahel-
Sahara region to the Horn of Africa and onward, to the
Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands.
Ofﬁcial worry about the arc of instability and its multifari-
ous dangers was central to international interventions in Mali,
as I noticed in interviews in Western ministries during 2014
and 2015. One high-level French diplomat, for instance, re-
framed and renamed the wider geographical region in terms of
danger. To him, “when we speak about Sahel it goes from
Nouakchott [Mauritania’s capital] to Mogadishu. For me So-
malia is Sahel; it is one world.” His reason for this redesigna-
tion was that the armed groups active there, from al-Shabaab
in Somalia to Boko Haram in Nigeria and AQIM in Mali,
shared the same ideology and so shared the same “culture.” A
highly placed European military ofﬁcer offered a similar re-
gional remapping. “Wehave to seeMali in the larger picture. . . .
MINUSMA is part of an entirety that starts in the Gulf of
Guinea and ends in Somalia,” he said. However, he added a
different emphasis as he drew a mental map, plotting one
existing military or humanitarian intervention after another
along this arc. He continued: “Which risk is it really that we are
trying to handle in Mali?” The unspoken answer was princi-37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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northern European foreign ministry, a map drawn on a white-
board for an internal meeting showed how these multiple
threats converged as they approached Europe: on it, arrows
pointed outward from Libya’s conﬂict, representing “IDPs”
(internally displaced persons), “migration,” and “terrorism.”
One UK diplomat, meanwhile, talked of his country’s rising
interest in the Sahel in terms of “turning off the tap” of mi-
gration, as well as about the risk of the arc of instability ex-
panding. This arc has become so commonsensical that it now
even has its own moniker: the “banana of badness,” as the
diplomat admitted with a giggle.
In sum, Western states are increasingly mapping out a dis-
crete ﬁeld of intervention deﬁned by bundled and overlapping
dangers, a “threat cluster” in which one kind of threat may nest
within another, and so generating and reinforcing a general-
ized sense of danger and a concomitant will to intervene. In
this way, systemic issues and risks—terrorism, migration, and
criminal activity, driven as these are by global dynamics of
supply and demand, ofmass-mediated imagery andworldwide
ﬁnancial ﬂows—are projected outward, away from the (West-
ern) “core,” in Barnett’s term (2004). Although this process may
seem to work in Western ofﬁcials’ favor, because it shifts the
debate away from complex (domestic) policy areas toward a
distant geographic space, a grounded perspective complicates
this top-down view somewhat.
In interviews with front-line ofﬁcers dealing with the danger
zone, I came to see how they were ambivalently positioned
between the political priorities on risk and the challenges of
carrying out their daily tasks in a region beset by uncertainty
and overlapping agendas. To take one example, Anders was
the chief of one of the two European peacekeeping contingents
eventually sent up to northernMali, the Swedish one (the other
was Dutch, based in Gao). As I met him before deployment to
a new Timbuktu “supercamp” in January 2015 in the Swed-
ish Armed Forces Headquarters, he was the rising star of the
military: news stories had feted the Swedish deployment and
Anders’ role, even as the reporters’ questions mainly concerned
one topic—the risks to Swedish soldiers in the ﬁeld.
Anders downplayed such risks, however. He and his troops
were special forces whose skills had been honed in Afghan-
istan, like many other soldiers and contractors who were now
arriving into Mali. “We are not half as worried as any ene-
mies would be; in ﬁreﬁghts, I think no one is capable of de-
feating us,” he said. He had reason to be calm: like their
Apache helicopter–equipped Dutch counterparts, the Swedes
were extremely well equipped and well prepared, unlike the
African peacekeepers. Moreover, their task was intelligence-
gathering, including via drones, rather than patrolling and
securing areas, which was a much more dangerous task again
largely left to the Africans. Intel is normally “cold, wet, boring,
andmonotonous,”Anders quipped, “and now it will be hot, dry,
and monotonous.”
Anders’ mission was mapping of a tactical sort: to trace and
pinpoint elusive insurgents and foil their growing attacks onThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aUN peacekeepers in Timbuktu’s tense hinterland. One key
obstacle here was the narrow national remit of UN interven-
tion. Anders drew a map with arrows (representing terrorist
groups) branching out across the Sahel, similar to those I had
seen in European foreignministries. “We can squeeze the Coke
bottle a bit here,” he said, adding a squiggle, “but then the
problem just bursts out somewhere else.”
Unlike the ministries’ conceptual maps, however, Anders’
was more pragmatic and tactical. He knew time was of the
essence and that “if we don’t take risks, we end up facing a
much larger risk.” The UN camps sucked scarce water out of
Mali’s northern soils, and the soldiers’ heavy trucks ground
down fragile roads; local patience would not last forever, as
I had seen during the protests in Bamako. Aware of local
discontent, Anders deplored the lack of aid interventions,
seeing these as a crucial part of rebuilding the north. As for
his men, he was, after many years on external missions, mind-
ful of political risk aversion once casualties were taken. In-
stead of withdrawing at the ﬁrst sign of danger, he hoped that
“everyone will be patient and recognize that this will take
time.”
Such concerns, similarly expressed by peacekeepers and aid
ofﬁcials I met in Bamako, showed some of the limits of the
Western “cartopolitics” of danger. Despite the ofﬁcial talk of
a “single reality” of the Sahel/Horn of Africa belt—a “banana”
ripe with “badness”—practicalities and politics constantly got
in the way. The UN machinery was creaking, and local resis-
tance was too ﬂuid, while the French, British, and Americans
were still, to some extent, ensconced in their geographical si-
los. Grand visions for the Sahara, much as in the early French
colonial times, were blurring amid the shifting sands of
Mali’s rebel politics and the limited resources at the interven-
ers’ disposal. As Monica, the UN administrator, was eventu-
ally sent up north, she told me by Skype how she was being
tasked with almost single handedly managing a military camp
attacked by rebel missiles, hamstrung by a lack of provisions,
and protected only by risk-averse and ill-equipped African
peacekeepers. “Remote control,” Monica and others on the
front line knew, did not offer much control at all.
To conclude, crisis-hit and chronically neglected areas, such
as northern Mali and the wider Sahel-Sahara belt, are coming
to constitute, from the point of view of interveners, a peculiar
object of intervention. They are principally of concern as host
to a set of bundled dangers—a threat cluster—yet that cluster
becomes increasingly hard to address thanks to our very aver-
sion to assuming risk. As has been seen, this interventionist’s
dilemma is increasingly resolved by recourse to remote con-
trols, whether via technologies such as drones or via reliance
on regional forces, national aid workers, and other groups
willing or forced to shoulder risk. Yet such measures often
dramatically implode or simply fail to deliver, leading to novel
dangers and further withdrawal, and so to more reliance on
local or regional eyes, ears, and hands. Such reliance in turn
opens up new avenues for local engagement with the appa-
ratuses of intervention, as will be seen in the next section.37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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The Sahel is host to chronic and underfunded crises, in-
cluding food insecurity, recurrent droughts, climate change,
high population growth, and gloomy economic prospects. Yet
these issues are increasingly addressed by Western donors, if
at all, as root causes of immediate threats. In the UK Foreign
Affairs Committee report on the Sahel, for instance, the
Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce warned that Islamic ex-
tremism in the region “is an increasing threat to UK inter-
ests” and “that a failure to increase engagement would carry
greater risks.” Increased engagement here means not just
traditional security, as UK Defense Secretary Michael Fallon
has made clear when discussing defense versus development
spending: “The biggest problem we are facing now, in Libya,
in Liberia, even in Nigeria where they have lost control of the
northern province, in Sudan, in Yemen . . . is that these states
are starting to fail and that’s where in the end—sadly—you
end up having to intervene with armed force. So these aren’t
opposites. [UK Development Secretary] Justine Greening’s
budget and mine you should add together; they are security
budgets” (Forsyth 2014).
Such assertions are not new; in fact, they signiﬁcantly pre-
date 9/11, as Gupta (2015) has shown in a recent review on the
construal of poverty as a security threat. Dufﬁeld (2001:4–5),
in his seminal work on the securitization of development, has
put this trend in relation to changes in global capitalism, much
as Goldstein (2010) does in relating security discourse to neo-
liberalism. As capitalism has shifted from a logic of (unequal)
inclusion to a logic of exclusion since the 1970s, Dufﬁeld ar-
gues, development programs have been reshaped and “secu-
ritized.” Global exclusion, he insists, thus does not involve the
complete closing of doors; rather, the “strategic complexes” of
global liberal governance (involving intergovernmental orga-
nizations, donor governments, and other powerful actors) have
fomented a “subordinating social relationship” with target pop-
ulations and nations, shaped around the notion of underde-
velopment as a threat (Dufﬁeld 2001:5).
Although the securitization debate has generated proliﬁc
writings (for one recent intervention, see Pugh, Gabay, and
Williams 2013), the process is rarely discussed from “the other
side”—that is, from the perspective of aid recipients and
intervened-upon populations in the danger zone. A key ques-
tion arises in this interaction, namely:What happenswhen your
main asset becomes the risk that you constitute to others?
In Mali’s north, jihadist groups have certainly exploited the
risk aversion of Western states through spectacularly violent
acts against kidnapped victims, disseminated as “propaganda
of the deed” over social media (Bolt 2012), much as in other
settings, such as Libya or Syria. In this sense, violence and
insecurity are highly interactive, as our imagining of cata-
strophic threats is increasingly realized in real time through
murders perpetrated for political gain. However, this section
is principally concerned with the more subtle effects of West-This content downloaded from 158.143.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aern donors’ catastrophic imagination of the danger zone and its
noninsurgent inhabitants.
During ﬁeldwork in Mali in 2010 and 2011 on migration, I
would see how actors positioned themselves in direct re-
sponse to European priorities. The police, for instance, used
the “risk” of irregular migration through the Sahara as a way
of pushing for more development money. “Europe needs to
help us with projects in villages. That way, people can become
sedentary,” pleaded one border police chief as he complained
that EU money was only for “ﬁghting illegal migration.” Then
he proceeded to ask for funds on both fronts. “If you want to
ﬁght effectively against illegal migration in the north [of Mali],
you have to create a system in the style of Frontex [the EU
border agency],” he said, invoking European border patrol-
ling operations at sea. “But we too,” he exclaimed, “we have an
internal sea; our sea is the Sahara!”
The Malian gendarmerie expressed similar sentiments as
they called for more resources to patrol Mali’s long borders:
new border posts, computers, generators, vehicles, and even
petrol for these vehicles. These demands were justiﬁed, again,
by recourse to the threat cluster delineated above. To the
gendarmes, Central and West African migrants—suspected
of migrating irregularly to Europe, deported by Algeria into
the desert, and then left stranded in Mali—incarnated Eu-
rope’s concerns. “We need to have a transit center [for de-
portees] in Kidal or Gao and another in Bamako. It’s what we
told [the European partners],” one high-ranking gendarme
told me. “If not, once they arrive here they have nothing.
They’ll steal, rob, even kill, or they can be recruited by AQIM.
It’s a big problem.”
As theMalian forces’ “securitization” ofmigration indicates,
the best way to have the ear of Western donors was to invoke
the terrorist threat. This was the case not just for local forces
but also for civil society groups, as one humanitarian associ-
ation in Gao exempliﬁed to me in 2011. The association, set up
to care for migrants deported from Algeria, aimed to reinsert
deportees socioeconomically and to create local development
projects to “keep the youth” from leaving. The youngsters of
Gao, one of the association’s leaders explained, “have nothing
to do and so they risk heading off on migration, or they risk
becoming drug trafﬁckers, get involved in prostitution and all
that, or what is even more serious, they risk becoming coopted
by local militias or assimilated into organizations such as al
Qaeda. They [AQIM] are ready to come into town nowadays,
to take these youngsters and insert them into their structures.
This is our big fear.”
On ofﬁcial levels, the same pleas were in evidence. In April
2014, to give one example, the Malian president signed an ag-
ricultural accord with Morocco at a UN-sponsored conference
by which Moroccan investors could exploit a large tract of fer-
tile land around the Niger river. “The development of agricul-
ture in sub-Saharan Africa will certainly prevent these young
Africans from emigrating or joining terrorist cells operating in
the wide and vast desert of northern Mali,” the president said,
motivating the controversial decision (Benmehdi 2014).37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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(in)securitization of the self is taking hold in the danger zone,
as I would also see to some extent with friends active in
Senegal and Mali’s associative sectors.
As I had returned to Bamako in 2014, one of my ﬁrst ports
of call was the southern neighborhood of Magnambougou
and the home of a friend and earlier research participant,
Djibril. As I called on him, I knew times were tough. Djibril
was a deportee from Spain and had been involved in one of
the associations of “returnees” set up after his and other
migrants’ expulsion from Europe and Morocco. Through this
association, Djibril had managed to ensure on-off work on
projects funded by international organizations. Yet as the
2012 conﬂict began, donors and Western NGOs took ﬂight,
leaving Malians such as Djibril without employment. As I
called on him, I knew I was expected to bring solace of some
kind: my proposition was that he could work as my research
assistant.
Djibril’s frustration was palpable as we spoke, sitting in his
communal courtyard around a brewing teapot as his children
came and went. “You see, there are no jobs, what can we do?
We have to leave, don’t we?” I nodded yes, but I told him not
to forget the dangers on the road. He equivocated; perhaps he
did not actually want to leave again. The sun set over the yard
as Djibril kept talking; a strip light ﬂickered to life atop his
door and his children gathered on the bench underneath,
schoolbooks in hand. “So this is why the youth go and join
Mujao (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, one
of Mali’s jihadist groups), or go take a boat to Spain, or die
in the desert,” Djibril said, continuing along the lines of his
earlier argument as I shifted awkwardly in my seat.
As a marginal participant in the aid nexus of Bamako,
Djibril had bought into the mobilization of danger so present
in the relationship between Malian authorities, NGOs, and
their international partners. He was, in a not-so-subtle way,
using the risk of his own potential to migrate to make sure
that I kept to my word and employed him. However, he was
also critical of this remaining pathway to engagement. An-
other day, we had lunch together after meeting an IDP leader
who had frustratingly talked to us about the lack of support
for the displaced in Mali while false beneﬁciaries “ate all the
money.” Pondering this pilfering, Djibril said, with a ﬂat laugh,
“In order to be rich, you have to threaten. In our [deportee]
association, we have 1,000 members; we buy some arms, make
a [black Islamist] ﬂag, take a Westerner hostage, and we’ve
solved it!”
I might have let this statement pass as simply a one-off show
of sarcasm if it was not for its resonances with what ofﬁcials
such as those above were saying, or indeed with similar argu-
ments from other underemployed aid brokers. In my research
on irregular migration in 2010, I had been told by members
of Senegalese deportees’ associations similar to Djibril’s that
they were the ones who were really “ﬁghting migration,” unlike
the police or the NGOs that were running risk-awareness cam-
paigns with European development funding. One day, for in-This content downloaded from 158.143.0
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association, Mohammadou, as he pointed toward a vessel at
sea. “Look at the boat out there! It’s the garde espagnole.” The
Spanish Guardia Civil’s patrolling vessel came every day, he
said; its principal task was to deter any departures toward the
Spanish Canary Islands, which Mohammadou had once tried
to reach. “It can’t stop us,” he insisted. “If no money comes
soon from Europe, we will set off again. . . . This time we’ll be
100,000, or thousands of 12 year olds.” It sounded like a
warning from someone aware of both the depiction of mi-
grants as a threatening force and the legal constraints in de-
porting unaccompanied children. The deportees’ effort to
convince impatient youth to bide their time was the reason no
one was leaving, Mohammadou made clear. “We are wait-
ing now for any development projects to come through from
Europe,” he insisted. Their patience would not last forever.
These brief vignettes are simply meant to indicate some of
the more overt ways in which danger or speciﬁc types of risk
may be mobilized reﬂexively by those seen as being both risky
and “at risk”: the youth of West Africa who Kaplan (1994)
once described as “loose molecules in a very unstable social
ﬂuid, a ﬂuid that was clearly on the verge of igniting.” Ap-
proached systematically, such self-fashionings may open a win-
dow onto the new relationship forged between the inhabitants
of designated danger zones and the international community.
Besides showing an acute awareness of Western priorities, they
also serve as commentary on the local effects of the mobiliza-
tion of danger and the reorganization of intervention. Djib-
ril, along with many other Malians I spoke to, insisted on the
erosion of the country’s much-celebrated culture of trust, gen-
erosity, and welcoming (djatigiya) since the time of the con-
ﬂict. Yet in bemoaning this apparent erosion, locals such as
Djibril were simultaneously reasserting their shared values of
dignity, joking relationships, and national identity at the heart
of postindependence Malian society (see Whitehouse 2013). In
the equivocations and ambivalences, an opening may be found
for alternative pathways for engagement, mobilizing local op-
portunities, rather than catastrophic imaginations of clustered
threats. Here anthropologists will have plenty to contribute to
larger debates on international intervention as we grapple with
the reﬂexive nature of global danger and its local contestations
and mobilizations, and so “returning the gaze” (Charbonneau
2015:7) onto powerful systems of intervention that have all
too rarely faced such ground-level scrutiny.
Conclusion: Anthropology among the Dragons
This article has delineated some salient aspects in the emer-
gence of “danger zones” of the kind seen in Mali, with clear
parallels elsewhere, from the Somalia conﬂict to Libya’s post-
Gaddaﬁ chaos or the remote “war on terror” in the AfPak
borderlands. In all these settings, new models of intervention
premised on distance and bundled dangers are emerging.
However, as has been seen, these models are not easy to im-
pose. From the perspective of powerful states and actors, it37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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wired world, and how large efforts have been expended on
various levels to achieve this objective. Distance is physical:
international interveners withdraw key humanitarian, politi-
cal, and even military staff from the front line; build bunkers
in the “ﬁeld”; and develop new technologies of “remote con-
trol” via drones, satellites, and surveillance. Distance is social:
interveners outsource risky tasks to local staff, mercenaries,
or freelancers, deepening the divide between “local” and “ex-
pat,” former colonizer and colonized. Distance is conceptual:
donor governments and international organizations promote
new buzzwords and theories that end up acting as meta-
phorical containers for “others” affected by insecurity. And
ﬁnally, distance is psychological: as “we” in theWest withdraw
from danger zones, we are paradoxically tied more closely
than ever to these new no-go areas. Insurgents, knowing this,
may then tap into our fear with the help of a simple pocket-
knife and a webcam. For as the Control Risk executive said
at the launch of the Risk Map mentioned above: “There is no
longer any such thing as far away.”
There is much else to be said about the mapping and mak-
ing of danger zones; of how, all else failing, Western states con-
centrate on simply containing “threats” emanating from these
zones through ever-tougher border controls; of the psycho-
logical pull of danger on certain chance-takers, from daredevil
freelance reporters to volunteering ﬁghters; or of the brutal
connectivities generated by supposed distancing devices, as
seen in the “voyeuristic intimacy” of drones (Power 2013). How-
ever, I will end this piece with a brief overview of the larger
global picture of risk, hinted at by that Risk Map citation in the
preamble.
“As the bipolar world fades away,” Beck (1999:3) wrote in
his World Risk Society, “we are moving from a world of en-
emies to one of dangers and risk.” This may now seem rather
prophetical; yet as danger and risk are gaining salience, we
need to recall that risk should not be seen exclusively through
a negative prism. Risk is rather double-edged, source of both
fear and gains, as seen, for instance, in speculative global ﬁ-
nance. Ever since the 1970s oil crisis and the ﬁnancial revo-
lutions that followed it, the global economy has thrived on risk,
engendering a fundamental contradiction between increas-
ingly risk-averse citizens and politicians and the premium
put on rampant risk-taking not just in banking (ﬁnancial risk)
but also in sectors such as private security and mercenary
activity (security risk).
Risk is not just unevenly appreciated by different social
groups and sectors; as this article has shown, it is also dis-
tributed unevenly across our world map. In her work on the
global geography of capitalism, Sassen (1991) has shown the
ﬁnancial world to be condensed into “global cities” function-
ing as one-stop shops for speculative capital. Standing in
sharp contrast to these are similarly “extreme zones” for “new
or sharply expanded modes of proﬁt extraction” (Sassen 2014:
18): manufacturing hubs such as China’s Shenzhen or the
land-grab terrains of swathes of sub-Saharan Africa. These spe-This content downloaded from 158.143.0
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pend on a transfer of risk from costly Western laborers to
poorer counterparts, from bluechip companies to subcontrac-
tors, and from mining groups to the villages or habitats they
destroy. With this global map of risk distribution in mind, the
remote danger zones of concern here may be seen as similarly
specialized, but not in producing goods or forging out credit
default swaps. Rather, they serve as sites for the manufactur-
ing of one important “product” in contemporary world mar-
kets: insecurity or danger. They also serve as zones in which the
risk transfers prevalent elsewhere in our economies are taken
to their most extreme, as the powerful withdraw from view
and leave more vulnerable groups to deal with the dangers.
“Dangerization,” in short, has gone global in uncontrolla-
ble ways. As anthropologists, we may investigate this process
along many overlapping vectors, as this article has shown.
We may explore how risks are apportioned and transferred
socially, geographically, and through new technology; how
dangers are conjured, clustered, and spatially mapped out; or
how locals subvert or reinforce these impositions. We may
also take a broader view, critically returning to our disciplin-
ary beginnings in the marginal territories of the early colonial
world, as well as to the precolonial fears and desires that
steered early explorers’ quest for the unknown.
If we do so, we may see that, unlike in early colonial times,
the rewards that entry into the danger zone hold up are no
longer (or not only) the putative riches that once led explor-
ers such as the Frenchman René Caillié (1992) toward Tim-
buktu. Even though oil, gas, and minerals do retain their lure,
today’s gains are principally negative in kind; they are not
about conquest but about control. For here, in the heart of the
danger zone, lies the promise of converting uncontrollable
danger into manageable (countable, containable, and “kill-
able”) risk. Much like Caillié’s frustrated quest to discover
Timbuktu’s long-lost riches, this dream of global power is,
however, a losing prospect, as this article has shown, and a rich
one to explore for an anthropology critically attuned to its
past and open to its tense global present. Those Medieval
monsters with which I began have yet again come to inﬁltrate
the edges of our Google-era maps; worse, a growing Western
fear of venturing into their domains is now steering interven-
tion and involvement, creating a spiral of negative dynamics
from which it becomes increasingly difﬁcult to extricate our-
selves. Here anthropologists, thanks to our legacy of studying
the remote and the marginal, may play a trickster role in weav-
ing back and forth between the inhabitants of the danger zone
and international interveners, and between executive head-
quarters and the new blank spots on the map, straddling the
danger zone and its manifold contradictions.
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Dangerization Is Risky Business
Those of us who study Asia’s highlands have beneﬁted im-
mensely from the notion of “Zomia” as ﬁrst imagined by Wil-
lem van Schendel (2002) and later popularized by James C.
Scott (2009). Zomia, as an idea, helps to explain how lowland
civilizations have struggled with rebellious highland peoples,
many of whom have fought, on an almost permanent basis,
against assimilation, integration, and worse. As a model of
center-periphery relations, it has the advantage of reprioritiz-
ing the experiences of those too often dismissed as marginal to
both power and knowledge. Van Schendel’s original Zomian
argument is about redrawing the maps in our minds: it is as
much an argument about the power of academic delineation as
it is about the power of lowland armies. In this article, Ruben
Andersson does not pull van Schendel or Scott into the con-
versation. Instead, what he offers is an ethnographic map of
“global danger”: a Zomia writ large. Andersson helpfully chal-
lenges us to consider “dangerization” to better understand how
risk intolerance impacts our ability to inﬂuence the world.
Framed as an anthropological response to the proliferation of
“no-go zones,” he gives a shrewd impression of such danger,
while keeping himself, and his own attention, mostly on the
“safe” side of the divide. Andersson offers a reﬂection on the
lands of dragons, mostly through a mirror of sturdily con-
structed conceptualization.
In Andersson’s explanation of the “interventionist’s dilemma,”
perhaps the most strikingly constant message is about “Western”
interests. This curiously old-fashioned binary makes sense in
Mali and across the Sahel: I would suggest it is redundant in
many other places. Indeed, the emergence of new forms of co-
lonially minded resource exploitation, as we see in the many
places wheremuscled-upChinese businessesmake investments,
means that global risk is an increasingly global preoccupation.
With so much attention on those he calls “Western citizens,”This content downloaded from 158.143.0
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danger. It turns out to be fascinating. What Andersson offers is
a sharp interrogation of the boundaries and categories estab-
lished to guide interaction with “danger zones.” We learn that,
because of institutional and personal constraints, Andersson
remains distant from his dangerous ﬁeld, just like the “Western
interveners” he critiques. While the overall argument is in-
triguing, I wonder whether the circularity that it implies misses
themost fundamental challenges of a worldwhere getting killed,
kidnapped, arrested, mangled, or mauled is not, for many peo-
ple, a theoretical suggestion. Some might conclude that, with
Andersson’s critique, the dangers sketched out by risk consul-
tants, government ofﬁcials, military personnel, insurers, and
others are mere abstractions. Often, they are not.
One of the reasons that risk management is such a vast and
lucrative industry is that it should require specialist input to
help explain grounded experiences in an ever-changing world.
During the 15 years that I have been undertaking ﬁeld re-
search in and around Myanmar, I have seen the levels of risk,
as quantiﬁed by analysts, and danger, as felt on the ground,
rise and fall. From week to week, month to month, and year
to year, profound changes in conditions have inﬂuenced re-
search opportunities and constraints (see Farrelly 2012). This
“oscillation,” a Leachian (1954) ﬂourish, explains the need for
continuous assessment, close engagement, deep immersion,
and logistical adjustment, as well as for patience. There is
simply no steady state for “global danger” or its multitudinous
local interpretations. Andersson reminds us that these circum-
stances reward those prepared to commercialize risk by bun-
dling it for those who need to have it managed.
Furthermore, Andersson explains that “Western” interven-
tion can deploy techniques of “remote control,” literal and ﬁg-
urative, to support claims in places that remain dangerous. I
wonder whether this situation is as novel as it initially seems.
The reason that unruly spaces are allowed to persist is that
their comprehensive control is not essential. This is an argu-
ment about “nodes of control” that I have made elsewhere
(Farrelly, 2013), drawing on research in the disputed and often
violent India-Myanmar borderlands. Where governments can
maintain “nodes of control,” there is little incentive for deeper
engagement. Technologies that allow for power projection and
surveillance are ideal in this respect. The strategic value of such
nodes is not just found in Zomia, or in Africa’s “arc of insta-
bility.” It is also not a coincidence that the phrase “arc of in-
stability” once gained much attention among those who con-
sider Australia’s strategic landscape (see Ayson 2007; Wallis,
2012). If we take seriously the idea that danger blurs into our
own lives, then we need to think more about the extent to
which nodes of control may shape a great diversity of spaces
around us.
In his conclusion, Andersson argues that “a growing West-
ern fear of venturing into [dangerous] domains is now steer-
ing intervention and involvement.” Under these conditions,
social scientists of all stripes have some responsibility for un-
derstanding and interrogating grounded conditions, especially37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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of assertive engagement, there are practical concerns. Field re-
search in conﬂict zones and adjacent areas requires a portfolio
of skills that most of us struggle to maintain. Situational aware-
ness, a military term, is the foundation for survival. Anthro-
pologists and their fellow travelers should be well-equipped to
engage with our dangerous world. The problem is that too of-
ten our own assessments are outsourced to distant bureau-
cracies and those who struggle to put the risks in their rightful
contexts. Even when done well, risk assessment—a ﬂawed,
human undertaking—is still imprecise and artistic. For this
reason, Andersson should be commended for his superb ap-
praisal of this persistently relevant topic. Whether we are talk-
ing about Zomia or the Sahel, our analysis will matter both for
those whose will face some of these dangers and for those who
prefer to stay at home.Gabriella Körling
Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University,
Stockholm 106 91, Sweden (gabriella.korling@socant.su.se). 29 III 16
At a time of increasing anxiety over terrorism and migration
and of concomitant security measures, Andersson’s article of-
fers a welcome critical perspective on global concerns with
security. Andersson convincingly argues for the need to focus
on how “global forms of insecurity and danger are conjured,
mapped, and intervened upon.” Theoretically, Andersson en-
gages with critical security anthropology. Ethnographically,
his account is anchored in Mali and the surrounding region.
Drawing on his own ﬁeldwork on international interventions
in Mali, a country in which large areas nowadays are classi-
ﬁed as “no-go zones,” Andersson addresses the methodologi-
cal, ethical, political, and analytical challenges for anthropol-
ogy at a timewhen “ ‘security’ is now everywhere.”Recent years
have indeed seen the increasing dominance of a security
agenda not only in conﬂict-ridden Mali but also in neigh-
boring countries, who now ﬁnd themselves at the forefront
in the ﬁght against terrorism as part of an “arc of instability”
and “terrorist hot spots” that stretches from the Sahel to the
Horn of Africa. International interest and intervention in the
wider Sahel region is thus increasingly ﬁltered through a con-
cern with security and the “global” threats posed by terrorism.
Andersson argues that this has wide-ranging consequences for
local societies that become increasingly marginalized and dis-
connected, as previous contact points, such as tourist ﬂows, are
cut off due to security concerns at the same time that they are
“unevenly incorporated into the world economy of risk.” While
Andersson does a good job in uncovering the processes that go
into the conjuring up of danger and insecurity, it would have
been interesting to read more about the different components
of this world economy of risk and insecurity in general, butThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aespecially so in the case of Mali. The description of security
agencies and experts gives one indication, but what are the
manifestations of this world economy in Mali in particular?
Andersson’s “ethnography of danger” starts with a reﬂex-
ive account of his own dilemma as he was preparing for
ﬁeldwork in Mali and was faced with travel advice and se-
curity staff that told him not to go to northern Mali, colored
in red on maps of the country to indicate its status as a “no-
go” zone. Andersson thus raises the question of how to deal
with such warnings. Does one chose to enter or to stay away?
What are not only the methodological but also the political
and ethical consequences of such decisions? What are the
implications for anthropological engagement when favorite
ﬁeld sites become new “danger zones”? Doing ﬁeldwork in
Mali and in neighboring Niger, I have been faced with simi-
lar dilemmas, especially in the last couple of years. During an
ongoing research project in Mali, at one point at the high
point of tensions between the 2012 coup d’état and the French
military operation, my colleague and I decided not to go back
to Mali. In an article, we reﬂected on our choice of alternative
research strategies, as the “ﬁeld” had suddenly become inac-
cessible (Hagberg and Körling 2014). Andersson goes a step
further, as his account of his methodological dilemma also
points to the importance of reﬂecting on our own fears and
vulnerabilities at the same time that we critically examine the
political processes behind the increasing dominance of con-
cerns with insecurity and potential danger.
In the end, Andersson decided not to cross the “red line”
and to stay in Bamako, revealing a certain discomfort by
suggesting that this might have been a “cop-out.” At the same
time, he argues that it provided a reﬂexive starting point for
exploring the consequences of the fact that more and more
international actors choose to stay away from areas that are
considered dangerous, thereby contributing to their increasing
marginalization. The question that seems to remain or linger is
what happens to the relevance of anthropology if withdrawing
means that we can no longer contribute with perspectives and
the experience of local inhabitants living in areas labeled as
dangerous and insecure.
Andersson’s ethnography of the emerging security land-
scape in Bamako brings us into military and diplomatic ofﬁces
and headquarters. These are places that are still relatively
understudied, perhaps because of their seeming inaccessibility,
despite an increasing interest in and awareness of the impor-
tance of “studying up,” which in this “aid dependent” region is
often rendered into ethnographies of international develop-
ment actors and policy or state bureaucracies. Andersson
makes an important point about the changing “geography of
intervention” whereby both military and humanitarian inter-
ventions are to a large extent piloted from Bamako. This sit-
uation is maybe most strikingly symbolized by the implanta-
tion of MINUSMA’s headquarters in one of Bamako’s luxury
hotels. Andersson’s analysis reveals a hierarchy of risk as Af-
rican contingents of peacekeepers and local NGO staff are sent
to the still-unstable north at the same time as the mobility of37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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security concerns.
Andersson also points to the conﬂation of perceived threats,
such as terrorism, migration, and crime, that are then mapped
by Western diplomats and security experts onto the same geo-
graphical space, determining future interventions. This con-
ﬂation is also evident in Niger, where the EU Common Se-
curity and Defence Policy Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel
Niger), a part of the EU regional strategy for security and
development with the mission of combating terrorism and or-
ganized crime since 2015, is also supposed to contribute to
“stemming irregular migration.” The increasing dominance
of the so-called security-development nexus and its conse-
quences certainly needs to be critically examined by anthro-
pologists. At the same time, the concern with security has also
opened up new funding ﬂows, as the language of security is
appropriated by local associations and NGOs in their attempts
to access the “development rent” (rente du development; Bier-
schenk, Chauveau, and Olivier de Sardan 2000). Here security
is merely, and less dramatically, simply the latest priority im-
posed by international funding agencies.
In charting the possible contours of a “global ethnography
of danger,” Andersson clearly illustrates not only the poten-
tialities but also the urgency of an anthropological analysis of
the security agenda in the Sahel and beyond.Mark Maguire
Department of Anthropology, Maynooth University, Maynooth,
County Kildare, Ireland (mark.h.maguire@nuim.ie). 16 III 16
(In)security in the Round
Reading Ruben Andersson’s fascinating article immediately
called to mind a passage from Graham Greene’s The Quiet
American (1955). On the road from Tây Ninh to Saigon, the
main protagonist’s car runs out of fuel, and the passengers
are forced to seek shelter in an unmanned watchtower. As
night descends, it becomes clear that French Indochina is only
French during daylight hours. Darkness belongs to the enemy,
and so also does the future. As a foreign correspondent in
1950s Saigon, Greene experienced life in a danger zone, and his
writing explores fantasies of control, from the geopolitical to
the everyday and intimate. For me, Ruben Andersson’s eth-
nographic study of distance in today’s danger zones calls to
mind other literatures and maps that provoke one to think
about the spatial dimensions of security and insecurity.
This article calls for important methodological and theo-
retical discussions. I hope that it will raise awareness of the
institutional pressures felt by anthropologists planning ﬁeld-
work in a moment in which even the word “overseas” conjures
danger for university administrators and funding bodies. Surely
graduate training programs also need to discuss safety moreThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aopenly, although I question the wisdom of disseminating the
speciﬁcs of security protocols. Andersson’s theoretical deploy-
ment of Lianos and Douglas’s “dangerization” is also ven-
turesome. Ironically, however, the concept is itself a bit risky,
potentially leading to what Fredric Jameson terms premature
clariﬁcation, especially if coupled with all-explaining concepts
like neoliberalism or risk societies. But others will give more
fulsome methodological and theoretical comments. Here I
simplyunderline theessay’s spatial dimensionsandsuggest a few
ways to extend the analysis by attending to verticality, tempo-
rality, and multiple vectors.
“Here Be Dragons” may be read as an exciting anthropo-
logical essay on space. It describes actual experiences in a dan-
ger zone, discusses real or imagined threats emanating from
so-called blank spaces and the arc of instability, and points to
the roles played by technological solutions that offer interven-
tion at a distance. Ruben Andersson connects these different
scales and spaces masterfully. But what if we were to place his
discussion in a broader history of conﬂict, security, and every-
day danger? I was reminded of The Quiet American because
it opens a way into the vast literature on war and space that
includes many germane discussions. Writing in 1938, for ex-
ample, Bertrand Russell foresaw the dangerous alliance between
aerial power, private forces, and the new morality inherent in
(scientiﬁc) governing at a distance (Russell 1938). He foresaw,
in short, the multidimensional exercise of power in terms of
verticality. Today, important work is ongoing among geogra-
phers such as Stuart Elden, Derek Gregory, and others on the
spatial dimensions of twentieth-century warfare, especially asym-
metrical and counterinsurgency battle spaces. Thinking in terms
of verticality extends beyond “the higher ground,” historically
speaking, because it allows us to explore how violence and terror
are deployed in such a way as to draw distant battle spaces near,
generating new regimes of the visible, the invisible, and the
camouﬂaged.
When studying (in)security, then, space must be under-
stood in multidimensional ways even if anthropologists are
rightly critical of the often-poor information, the absence of
evidence, or the many other gaps and ﬁssures in security-
scapes. Security and risk maps, like the ones Andersson shows
us, often purport to be dynamic or even real-time maps, but
they are often little more than representations of historical
data layered with media updates and forecasting. That said,
some security consultancies distance themselves from their
own predictions, such as the Security Analysis and Research
Consultancy’s recent report on Nigeria, which admitted the
difﬁculties in forecasting due to “underlying elements” such as
“social injustice.” But again we must think in spatiotemporal
terms, and once more the Vietnam wars are illustrative of ear-
lier virtualization experiments: recall US Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara’s efforts to visualize and then violently dis-
rupt the Ho Chi Minh trail with a wall of sensors connected to
aircraft circling overhead, together with “antipersonnel” mines
underfoot. Spaces of (in)security have long been dynamic and
multidimensional. Temporality is important here.37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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fascinating and deserve more attention. Andersson does a
wonderful job of using the concept of dangerization to con-
nect different processes in the security-scape, from transfor-
mations in the institutional and sectoral division of labour to
the bundling together of potential threats. Indeed, the nega-
tive publicity surrounding recent UN drone operations in
Africa surely supports the case he makes. Of course, people
in Mali experience this dangerization in speciﬁc ways, and
Andersson’s reﬂexive essay presents some of those experi-
ences while attempting to say more. His ﬁeldsite seems to
vibrate and shift under foot. The speed of change is shocking,
and now Mali is perceived, conceived, and lived in as an
expanding arc of instability. But what of the spatiotemporal
dimensions of dangerization within centers of security calcu-
lation? For European security experts, terrorism is approached
in terms of speciﬁc spatiotemporal vectors. In short, experts
see the future in Africa—Paris-style “marauding” attacks to-
day,WestgateMall or Ougadougou special forces–style attacks
tomorrow. But the future is also very near. The vectors of so-
called radicalization are onematter, but as the European Police
Ofﬁce recently warned, the threat is already here, with 5,000
“jihadists” and “home grown” threats inside fortress Europe.
Simultaneously, this form of dangerization works off useless
bimodal distributions and a very useful multidimensional and
near-future security milieu. Danger, then, is not necessarily in
the form of Boko Haram or al-Shabaab. Rather, Jacques Der-
rida’s (1997:84) formulation seems more ﬁtting, “a mobile
multiplicity of potential interchangeable metonymic enemies,
in secret alliance with one another: conjuration.”Jeffrey A. Sluka
Social Anthropology Program, Massey University, Palmerston North
4442, Aotearoa/New Zealand (j.sluka@massey.ac.nz). 31 V 16
While anthropology has always been, at least tangentially,
interested in the topic of security, the anthropology of security
is an emerging ﬁeld that ties in with the parallel emergence of
a new multidisciplinary “human security studies,” because both
focus on presenting critical, grounded, and local alternatives to
the state-centered emphasis, in traditional security studies, on
national security.
As Tessa Diphoorn has recently observed, security is a “hot
topic” that is “indicative of a deﬁning moment in late mo-
dernity” (2015), and the growing interest of anthropologists
in this topic has been highlighted by Daniel Goldstein’s call
for a critical anthropology of security. Goldstein argues that
“the world has entered a kind of ‘security moment,’ a new
phase of global history characterized by increased surveillance
of potential security threats, expansive government powers
to investigate security breaches, armed intervention in places
that supposedly foster terrorism, and restriction on individualThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
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curity” (2010:487).
The promise or opportunity for the discipline in this area
is the critically engaged research Goldstein calls for, which
explores and elucidates the “important relationships between
security discourse and practice, human and civil rights, and
the entailments of neoliberalism by offering a perspective on
these issues which is at once ethnographically sensitive and
attuned to contemporary global interconnections” (2010:487).
In particular, anthropology is well placed to contribute im-
portant analyses of the security apparatus, its politics and sup-
porting ideology, and its impacts on local communities. This
article by Ruben Andersson is an excellent example of how this
promise is now coming to fruition.
Andersson also illustrates the signiﬁcant threats of working
in this ﬁeld. Beyond the obvious existential ones to personal
health and safety (which I have written about managing or
ameliorating; see Sluka 1990, 1995, 2012, 2015), the most
signiﬁcant threat is the epistemological one represented by
the fact that one of the freedoms under increasing restriction
is academic freedom to conduct ﬁeldwork, particularly “en-
gaged anthropology,” in an increasing number of “no-go
zones”—locations ofﬁcially deﬁned as so dangerous and “in-
secure” as to require control over access to them by researchers
and others (e.g., tourists). It is becoming increasingly difﬁcult,
in some cases now nearly impossible, to attain the growing
number of ethical and other institutional approvals required
to do such research.
This is amply illustrated by Andersson’s case. He was re-
quired by his university to complete an extensive and detailed
risk assessment, ﬁll in multiple lengthy forms, attend security
meetings, familiarize himself with safety procedures, engage
with a private security contractor, and acquire expensive in-
surance. His experience with negotiating this process leads
him to conclude that today “none but the most dedicated”
should “even attempt” to conduct research in such “red zones”
as Mali. This process presented him with an “anthropological
dilemma at the edge of the danger zone,” which he could only
resolve by agreeing to severely restrict where he conducted
his ﬁeldwork, basically conﬁning himself to the capital city of
Bamako. That is, he was prevented from actually entering the
rural areas in northern Mali where security is the most prob-
lematic and pressing issue.
Andersson admits that, to gain approval to conduct research
in Mali, he basically had to decide to “stay away” from enter-
ing the country’s rural “danger zone,” which even he suspects
may have represented a “cop-out.” When he was compelled
to do that, he was in effect imposing on his research the same
“bunkering” he refers to as occurring with and limiting the
success of state and international (e.g., UN) civil and military
agencies, which he identiﬁes as causing resentment, suspicion,
and distrust—all of which are, of course, anathema to an-
thropological ﬁeldwork.
The “interventionist dilemma”Andersson identiﬁes state agen-
cies as facing has a direct parallel with a serious emerging epis-37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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research must be increasingly managed at arm’s length, because
we are no longer permitted by the authorities to put our “boots
on the ground” or risk “coming into harm’s way,” which leads
to “ambivalent engagement and anxious withdrawal: stuck on
the margins of danger zones, seeing them through the eyes of
local helpers or the latest surveillance machinery. . . . Relation-
ship by remote control.” This disturbing development is evi-
dence of a new politics of control that implies an involuntary
return to the discredited early form of “veranda anthropol-
ogy,” most famously criticized byMalinowski, which effectively
threatens a recolonization of the discipline.
Andersson observes that the putatively expanding ﬁelds of
“global danger” are ofﬁcially deﬁned and restrictions on ac-
cess to them are enforced by state institutions, universities,
funding agencies, insurance companies, and other “powers
that be.” He insightfully notes that this deﬁnition of the red
zones of the world is highly politicized, controversial, and often
exaggerated. He is also correct to stress that this politically
motivated “dangerization” process “has gone global in uncon-
trollable ways” and is ultimately not about security but rather
“control.”
Just as there is a popular (mis)conception that we live in a
“postracial” era, there is a parallel belief that the contempo-
rary age of economic or capitalist “globalization” is a post-
imperial one. While Andersson does pointedly refer to inter-
vention, neoconservatism, global capitalism, and “security’s
broader ‘colonization’ of ever-larger parts of social life,” he
does not clearly identify that this is fundamentally related to
ongoing imperialism. The impact of imperialism, the never-
ending and near-inﬁnite source of resistance and conﬂict, is
now being redeﬁned as “insecurity.” The forms, style, and
mechanisms of imperialism have evolved from direct imperi-
alism, to neoimperialism, then debt-leverage imperialism, and
now what may be characterized as “security imperialism.” Just
as the old imperial mission was represented as “civilization,”
the new face of imperial intervention is disguised behind the
mask of “security.”
We should not be fooled. Is anyone naive enough to believe
that the growth of securitization, the mass expansion of the
state security complex, and the emerging global politics of
security—for example, the massive expansion in recent years
of the US Africa Command across the African subcontinent—
is really about helping, aiding, or assisting the peoples and
nations of the region, or motivated by a desire to actually pro-
vide them with security? It is imperative that the phenomenon
of security and securitization at both global and local levels
must be read within an overtly neoconservative and neoim-
perial global geopolitics.
If we are to continue the honorable tradition in anthro-
pology of critical anti-imperialism, wemust energetically resist
the forces that increasingly seek to compel us to “cop-out” of
ﬁeldwork in the increasing swathes of the planet ofﬁcially
deﬁned as “no-go areas,” “red zones,” and “failed states.” We
cannot, as Andersson suggests, play the “trickster role” ofThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a“weaving back and forth between the inhabitants of the dan-
ger zone and the international interveners” if we cannot do
ﬁeldwork with those inhabitants and are once again conﬁned
to the “veranda.”Bruce Whitehouse
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Lehigh University,
31 Williams Drive, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania 18015, USA
(brw208@lehigh.edu). 17 III 16
As a Mali specialist, I am forced, in a wrenchingly personal
sense, to confront the problems of risk and distance described
here. My desire to become an anthropologist was sparked dur-
ing Peace Corps service in Mali from 1997 to 2000; I conducted
my ﬁrst ethnographic ﬁeldwork inMali in 2002, returning every
two to three years thereafter to renew friendships and under-
take new research. I was there as the country plunged from
“donor darling” to “failed state” over the ﬁrst 6 months of
2012.12 The gravity of the country’s crisis only truly dawned on
me in early April of that year, when Peace Corps Mali evac-
uated its volunteers, something unprecedented in its 41-year
existence, despite major famines in the 1970s and 1980s and
political unrest and a military coup in the early 1990s.
Before 2012, like many others, I had seen Mali as a fun-
damentally stable, safe place to live and work, unlike Liberia,
Congo, or other “basket cases.” Its people were known for
their friendliness and vibrant artistic scene. For years, Ma-
lian authorities capitalized on their country’s positive image
abroad to attract revenue from tourism, cultural festivals and
exchanges, and foreign investment. With the beneﬁt of hind-
sight, we see that this image was generated only by papering
over deep divisions within Malian society including, but by no
means limited to, intergroup tensions in the country’s north-
ern regions.
Today the Malian state is on UN life support. As Ander-
sson observes, Mali’s people are on edge, increasingly wary of
the “international community” in general and its presence in
their country. And Mali is by no means unique in the region
for its newly “dangerized” image: since the time I served in
the Peace Corps, that organization has pulled its volunteers
out of half a dozen West African countries amid risks posed
by political violence and the Ebola virus. A few months after
restarting its Mali program in mid-2015 (albeit on a limited
scale and far from the country’s northern “red zones”), the
Peace Corps shut it down again in the wake of an attack on
Bamako’s Radisson hotel during which Islamist militants killed
20 civilians (one American, two Belgians, three Chinese, one
Israeli, six Malians, six Russians, and one Senegalese). Mali and
much of West Africa are now effectively off limits for most
citizens of wealthy countries.37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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imposes heavy costs, not just on those areas’ inhabitants but
also on anthropology and any other ﬁeld in which analysis
requires and valorizes local knowledge. Many of my fellow
Africanist scholars in the United States got their start work-
ing on the continent for the Peace Corps or NGOs at the
community level. Most American social scientists I meet who
have worked in Guinea, Mauritania, or the Central African
Republic also began on that professional track. Today, how-
ever, it is exceedingly difﬁcult if not impossible for young
North Americans or Europeans to acquire ﬁrst-hand experi-
ence of everyday life in places like these. Recent terrorist
attacks in Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire have added those
countries to the high-risk category. Western government agen-
cies are reluctant to send their staff to such places, and research
grants will no longer underwrite ﬁeldwork there. In the years
ahead, the ongoing mapping of security threats and the process
of “risk transfer” Andersson describes will dramatically reduce
the capacity of outsiders (and not just Westerners) to under-
stand societies and peoples of the Sahel, central Africa, or other
“hot spots” in emic terms.
The instrumentalization of real and perceived risk by Af-
rican elites and ordinary citizens alike, whether concerning
terrorism, migration, or environmental destruction, ﬁts into
longstanding strategies of extraversion on the continent (Bayart
2000). Yet leveraging risk seems like an increasingly attractive
option in Africa these days. Given a choice between remaining
loyal to the existing political system, voicing critiques of that
system, or exiting it altogether (to use Hirschman’s [1970] ter-
minology), subjects of contemporary African regimes may see
few incentives for loyalty and no space for productive nonvio-
lent critique. As Malians followed the progress of 2015 negoti-
ations to resolve their country’s latest Tuareg rebellion against
the central government—negotiations in which donor govern-
ments played an active role—many who felt their loyalty had
gone unrewarded asked whether taking up arms against the
state was their best hope of making their voices heard. Seek-
ing beneﬁts by posing a danger to the state and/or to regional
security seems to pay the greatest dividends; as Djibril put it
to Andersson, “In order to be rich, you have to threaten.” Pro-
vided, that is, one does not adopt the language of Islamism to
make those threats; doing so could make one the target of a
French air strike. In the current post–Cold War, postcolonial
order, some threats may be bargained with, others must sim-
ply be eliminated.
Meanwhile, many of Africa’s young men and a growing
number of its young women see the option of exit through
emigration as their most likely route to economic and personal
self-fulﬁllment. The consensus linking migration to poverty
noted by Andersson among ofﬁcials and would-be migrants,
however, ignores an inconvenient fact: the world’s poorest
countries tend to produce more international migrants, not
fewer, as their economies develop (Flahaux and de Haas 2016).
If the migration of Africans poses a problem to African and
Western governments, it is a problem with no easy ﬁxes.This content downloaded from 158.143.0
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youth (Honwana 2012) to the uncertainty faced by those of
us in the West who have built careers on specialized knowl-
edge of places now considered no-go areas. I continue to hope
that Mali will one day soon have cause to be decategorized as
an exporter of danger. In the meantime, though, Andersson’s
work offers valuable insight into the role of the anthropologist
in the danger zone.Reply
Before I set off for Bamako in 2014, a formerly Mali-deployed
European military ofﬁcer advised me to book into the city’s
Radisson: “It’s the only hotel with armed guards.” In the
autumn of 2015, it was that very hotel that jihadists chose as
their high-proﬁle target in a complex attack of the kind later
to be replicated in Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast. As a result,
the interveners’ bunker mentality was yet again reinforced in
Bamako, while attacks on peacekeepers tragically kept com-
ing thick and fast in Mali’s north. In those days, one frus-
trated Bamako-based aid worker told me that the problem
with Mali was that “the threat is everywhere, everybody, at
any time.”
I bring up these incidents to make clear that the dangers
lurking in faraway places are not mere abstractions, as Nich-
olas Farrelly suggests a reader of “Here Be Dragons” may in-
fer. They are certainly real enough. Nor does ﬁnicky risk man-
agement, for all its problems, always serve as crude access
control of the kind Jeffrey Sluka criticizes in his important
defense of engaged anthropology in risky areas. Unlike the
journalists prevented from entering northern Mali during
France’s Operation Serval “for their own safety” while French
soldiers ﬁlmed their own redacted war, I could theoretically
have headed to the no-go north—at my own risk. As I wrote,
“my apprehensions cannot be blamed on institutional straight-
jackets alone.” I believe the same goes for many other research-
ers and workers deployed to crisis areas: we bemoan the re-
strictions, yet more often than not abide by them, or simply stay
away. It is easier that way, especially since it seems so hard to
control, assess, and quantify distant dangers—that is, to turn
them into calculable risk—and since full liability shifts onto
us as soon as we stray from supposed safety.
There is much work to be done on the practical, political,
and ethical dimensions of access here. Anthropologists work-
ing on risky areas can, for instance, reveal how strict security
protocols may principally serve to “cover the asses” of the
higher-ups, to cite one angry European ofﬁcial reﬂecting to
me on his fruitless, fortiﬁed deployment into conﬂict-hit Libya.
We may also show how such protocols often generate insur-
mountable distance from local society while proposing much-
needed alternatives of the kind that several of the insightful37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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over the years. However, what I principally sought to shine a
light on in my piece was a broader anthropological line of in-
quiry stemming from that initial methodological conundrum,
namely: what kind of world emerges from attempts to keep
danger at bay—contained, calculated, and controlled—pre-
cisely at the moment when “danger itself” is running wild and
free, systemic rather than strictly locality bound? How are
world-ordering and world-disordering knowledges, practices,
and mechanisms focused on fear and danger shaping not just
the physical and social terrain (to use military terminology) but
also the mental one, on which so many of today’s horriﬁc bat-
tles are fought? On what historical legacies is this peculiar land-
scape of intervention built, and what relationships between Self
and Other are being forged upon it?
From a historical viewpoint, there is indeed something
rather old-fashioned afoot in my piece, as Farrelly notes. That
is so for an empirical reason: today’s large-scale international
interventions rehearse those of earlier eras. The “dragons” of
our maps may be globally spread, but not evenly so. It is the
old colonial and imperial powers of the West that invest most
in both conjuring them and keeping them at bay and which,
moreover, have the ﬁrepower and global projection needed to
do so. In Mali, the Chinese have provided a peacekeeping
contingent, but their principal interest (as Farrelly notes
more broadly) is resources and markets. That generates its
own problems, but much less so than framing the relation to
the Sahel in terms of danger, as Western powers are increas-
ingly doing. As Sluka notes, we are facing a geopolitical mo-
ment in which “security” may motivate multifarious interven-
tions across diverse societies folded intoUS “homeland security”
or European border strategies.
In investigating this mapping and management of risk and
danger, we may start, along with Mark Maguire, with the
conjoined spatial and temporal stakes at work. In the fortiﬁed
Kabul of 2016, to skip across the “arc of instability,” the daily
rhythms of expatriates take on shifting hues of risk. Ofﬁcial
restrictions on movement stretch, in the terminology, from
“green city”—traveling between safe destinations allowed—
to “white city,” or lockdown. And lockdown is increasingly
what life is about for civilian expats, while US ofﬁcers roar past
in helicopters shuttling them safely from airbase to head-
quarters.
While maps of red, black, and green zones provide decep-
tively neat two-dimensional renderings of risk, danger and
“distanciation” rather play out over four sprawling dimen-
sions: horizontally, vertically, and temporally. I trace these
dimensions in my larger project (Andersson, forthcoming),
but sufﬁce it to say here that today’s warriors and interveners
are themselves very much aware of the complex spatial-
temporal stakes involved. For instance, drone operators refer
to the “soda straw effect,” a metaphor that acknowledges the
vastly reduced understanding of the world below, seen in little
round glimpses afforded by the burning eye in the sky. The
soda straw metaphor moreover frames our interests in thatThis content downloaded from 158.143.0
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gence as possible, generating, in Maguire’s words, “new re-
gimes of the visible, the invisible, and the camouﬂaged.”
The soda straw effect echoes what Weizman (2007), in his
study of shifting Israeli strategy in Gaza, calls a “politics of
verticality.” On the basis of this vertical dimension, it is
tempting to go along with critical writers on drone warfare
and ﬂesh out ethnographically what Shaw (2013) has termed
“predator empire”—or US biopolitical targeting of “danger-
ous life patterns” over an ever-extending battle space of “kill
boxes” and “mowed lawns,” to cite the virtual warriors’ jar-
gon. Yet while such critical perspectives are important, there
are reasons why I steer away from the imperial terminology
suggested by Sluka. The foremost is the risk Maguire iden-
tiﬁes in deploying potentially “all-explaining concepts” when
facing a distinct conﬁguration of power. In fact, this is pre-
cisely why I rather ﬁnd it useful to globalize the term “dan-
gerization” as it links up small-scale internal security ﬁelds with
“external” ones. Rather than offering “premature classiﬁca-
tion,” it can serve as a tool and a torch that helps cast a differ-
ent light on deeper trends that may not fully (or not only) ﬁt
into the frame of empire.
As we shine such a ﬂickering light into the global margins,
the productivity of these should strike us. As Farrelly notes,
full control is by no means necessary in the unruly “global
Zomia(s)” of today. Rather, distant disorder may be produc-
tive and proﬁtable in its very unruliness. To ﬁnd an analytical
language for this productivity, I brieﬂy suggested building
on Saskia Sassen’s insights into intensiﬁed trends of capitalist
value extraction combined with a productive take on the value
of global risk itself. Through this lens, seemingly remote zones
look rather central to a new world disorder in which they serve
as a convenient stage for geopolitical battles, for struggles over
illicit cross-border ﬂows, and for media-fuelled propaganda
wars, as seen from the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands to the
Sahara. While these examples remain Western-centric, I insist
that “Here Be Dragons” simply provides a rough road map
for a fuller global investigation of the political economies and
geographies of danger, focused perhaps most fruitfully on the
novel frontiers of value extraction and risk taking in evidence
in such disparate areas as “old Zomia,” the Sahel/Sahara, and
the Amazon.
Amid the proliferation of threats and opportunities, con-
tainment emerges as a key objective, especially in theWestern-
designated arc of instability. Yet efforts to isolate and block
perceived threats while transferring them to an “elsewhere” is
a fraught prospect, as danger proliferates in nonlinear ways
outside “kill boxes” or red zones of risk.
One fruitful way for anthropologists to approach this mess
(and complement the vast literature from other disciplinary
perspectives) is via the relationships forged through contain-
ment. Take AMISOM, the African Union “peace operation”
(or,more accurately, counterterror campaign) in Somalia, which
has seen countless deaths of EU-paid and UN-equipped Afri-
can soldiers over its faltering decade-long existence. “We are37.227 on December 15, 2016 04:05:07 AM
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provide the cash, we provide the bodies. That is the balance.”
This was how one Kenyan colonel put the deal to me amid
anger at an EU paycut for troop-contributing states in 2016.
While the risk hierarchies pinpointed in my article were very
clear to the colonel, he also insisted that Somalia was prin-
cipally a theatre for global dangers abetted by Western in-
terveners themselves. As he put it, echoing Malian military
ofﬁcers in Bamako: “Somalia’s not a regional problem. The
reason why the EU is funding is because they want the problem
to be contained in Africa. They don’t want . . . large masses of
Somalis knocking at the door of Europe trying to seek refugee
status.” Without fresh funding, he concluded, “it will be difﬁ-
cult to sustain operations, and it may reach a level where re-
gional states begin to say, ‘We pull back to our borders.’”
In short, containment strategies rarely if ever contain sys-
temic risks. This includes, inter alia, the problems generated
when outsourced partners start “leveraging risk,” to cite Bruce
Whitehouse: AMISOM troop contributors have become de-
pendent on the mission to fund and keep busy their ailing
armies. It also includes the “multidimensional” threats Ma-
guire refers to, which are of course upmost on Western secu-
rity experts’ minds. As one European peacekeeper put it to
me, the “enemy” back in his home capital was more well pre-
pared and dangerous than the one in Mali’s north. Yet while
politicians focus on limiting risk exposure to soldiers in the
ﬁeld, terror attacks on soft targets keep escalating, generating
distressing new risk hierarchies and risk transfers both outside
and within “the West” itself.
If containing danger geographically remains a dangerous
fantasy, the mental terrain of danger likewise feeds excess and
perpetuation. In 1994, setting the stage for our fearful pres-
ent, Rwandan ﬁghters killed and mutilated 10 Belgian troops,
swiftly triggering the withdrawal of their contingent—at the
core of the UN mission—and so paving the way for the geno-
cide. Later a senior Rwandan ofﬁcial said, “WewatchCNN too,
you know.” As Koﬁ Annan (Annan and Mousavizadeh 2012:
57) noted, “He was referring to the lesson that they had gar-
nered from Somalia the year before [in the “Black Hawk
Down” incident]: that the death of just a few foreign peace-
keepers would be enough to end the appetite for intervention
and allow them to get on with their murderous plans.”
Nightmares, then, have an uncanny tendency to materi-
alize, and no one knows this better than the social media–
attuned murderers of Daesh, as they use the withdrawal of
large media organizations from the “danger zone” to their ad-
vantage in feeding stagings of Western fears into the atrocity-
hungry international news circuit. A gruesome video of early
2015, for instance, showed the brutal murder of 21 Egyptian
Coptic Christians on a Libyan beach. The video may have
been full of fakery but that mattered little as newscasts readily
spread the murderers’ propaganda around the world. In their
clip, they cunningly staged the bundled fears of mass migra-
tion, conﬂict, and terrorism to Western audiences, sullying
that perfect medium—the turquoise Mediterranean waters,This content downloaded from 158.143.0
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of danger.
Anthropologists have plenty of tools in our inherited an-
alytical kit to study these fraught borderlines between safety
and danger, between self and “absolute Other,” but to return
to my opening lines, our practical preparation is rather more
scant. Körling, along with Sluka, expresses rightful concern
over our disciplinary relevance if we cannot access local in-
habitants, while Whitehouse takes this further by noting that
a wider risk-averse retreat reduces chances to obtain formative
experiences of other places and cultures, and so limits future
connections of a deeper kind, including anthropological ones.
We must ﬁnd ways of bridging these divides. We need
more frank discussion among anthropologists of the options
at hand and the limits of our reach. In this, we can learn from
aid workers, journalists, peacekeepers, and locals who have
braved the front lines, while building further on my comment-
ers’ own insightful interventions into ethnography “among the
dragons.”
In my project, instead of bridging the divide, I rather take
that divide itself as the object of inquiry. My starting point
is the anthropological frontier zone where our traditional
methods reach their point of near impossibility. Participant-
observation may here be not just a fundamental part of anthro-
pology’s “educational” ethos, in Ingold’s (2014) holistic sense,
but also function as a tool for “testing the waters.” How far
does it reach, and what does this limit tell us?
In the world’s growing resistance to our methods, we may
come to see ourselves as bit players in a larger historical
drama that harks back to the days of veranda anthropologists
and precolonial explorers. While we should be cognizant of
the risk of disciplinary “recolonization,” as Sluka puts it, there
is one large difference this time round: our capacity to reach
across scales and frames of analysis, developed over decades
of anthropological critique. Building on this, we should cer-
tainly persevere in gaining access to societies on the “mar-
gins,” yet we also need to do more. Among other things, we
can turn the making and makers of those margins into our
object of study, and so straddle—in whatever way we can, by
whichever means are at hand—the borderlands of globalized
danger.
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